Consequentialism and History

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8093413
AutoresPaul Gomberg (autor de correspondencia)
Año1989
Volumen19
Número3
Páginas383-403
Fecha de publicación1989-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaCanadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1080/00455091.1989.10716486
OpenAlexW786289006
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas21
Referencias citadas3

John Stuart Mill wrote in the opening chapter of Utilitarianism , ‘A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong,’ thus explaining why he thought the work to follow was practically important. In Chapter 3, ‘On the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility,’ he answers the question, ‘What are the motives to obey the principle of utility?’ This principle is presented as a morality to be adopted . Yet before the nineteenth century was over Henry Sidgwick was proposing that it may well be best, from a utilitarian view, that the utilitarian doctrine is not too widely adopted. Perhaps it should be an esoteric morality. Moreover, Sidgwick argues, it seems contrary to self interest to adhere to an impartially benevolent morality. Devotion to utilitarian duty seems to require that the agent sacrifice his or her own happiness in a devotion to the relief of others that can only ‘partially mitigate’ their distress (502-3). Such a morality seems impossibly demanding. Sidgwick’s argument challenges Mill's claim that there is an adequate sanction for adoption of utilitarian morality

Argument (complex analysis · Consequentialism · Doctrine · Duty · Economics · Epistemology · Ethical egoism · Happiness · Mill · Morality · Political science · Positive economics · Sacrifice · Theology · Utilitarianism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · History · Law · Philosophy