The Fundamental Wrong of Colonialism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6325786
AutoresRitwik Agrawal (0000-0002-9951-7557, Department of Philosophy, Social Sciences University of Arizona Tucson Arizona USA), Allen Buchanan (0000-0001-8026-2446, Department of Philosophy, Social Sciences University of Arizona Tucson Arizona USA)
Año2025
Volumen53
Número2
Páginas184-196
Fecha de publicación2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papa.12282
OpenAlexW4407110205
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas24

We offer an account of the nature and structure of the immorality of colonialism. We distinguish between the fundamental wrong of colonialism and the other wrongs that the fundamental wrong facilitated. On our view, the fundamental wrong was that colonizers regarded the colonized as incapable of managing their own affairs, in effect relegating them to the status of minors or mentally incompetent adults. We call this the nonautonomy assumption. It could also be called the inferior status assumption, for reasons that will become clear as we proceed. We argue that, in addition to the nonautonomy assumption, the most serious wrongs of colonialism were severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation, and that these wrongs can reasonably be seen to be facilitated by or grounded in the fundamental wrong. We make the case that our analysis has two virtues: it provides a more comprehensive characterization of the wrongs of colonialism and the relationships between them than extant philosophical accounts and it helps make sense of the concepts of neocolonialism and internal colonialism, which extant accounts are unable to do. This has the added advantage of bringing discussions that have hitherto taken place in fields such as political theory, postcolonial studies, history, and critical theory into the ambit of analysis by political philosophers, using tools and concepts that philosophers have at their command, such as the notions of autonomy and inferior status. After developing our own view, we offer a critical appraisal of three prominent recent attempts to identify “the wrong” of colonialism, the views of Anna Stilz, Massimo Renzo, and Lea Ypi. We argue that by focusing on defects of the political structure of colonialism such as the deprivation of collective self‐determination, these accounts do not clearly identify the fundamental wrong of colonialism and either completely ignore or pay insufficient attention to severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation; and that they also render the notions of neocolonialism and internal colonialism unintelligible. While acknowledging that the nonautonomy assumption encouraged colonialists to deprive the colonized of collective self‐determination and recognizing that this was a serious wrong, we deny that the deprivation of collective self‐determination was the fundamental wrong of colonialism, as the denial of autonomy is more basic than the denial of political self‐management. The analysis we offer makes it clear that colonialism is not a topic of merely historical interest. The most serious wrongs suffered by colonized people did not end with decolonization, that is, the achievement of independent statehood. The fundamental wrong of colonialism was grounded in inequalities of power that persist today and that continue to contribute to economic injustices and to the failure to regard the weaker as equals, in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to the case of formerly colonized peoples

Colonialism · Political science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · History · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics