Establishing a Continuum from Minimizing to Maximizing Bureaucrats
State Agency Head Preferences for Governmental Expansion—A Typology of Administrator Growth Postures, 1964–98
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6358979 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Cynthia J Bowling, Chung‐lae Cho, Deil S Wright |
| Año | 2004 |
| Volumen | 64 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 489-499 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2004-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00394.x |
| OpenAlex | W2158844191 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 8 |
| Referencias citadas | 27 |
Scholars have long suspected the blanket description of bureaucrats as “budget maximizers” is simplistic and inaccurate. This article provides empirical grounds for questioning that description and enhances our understanding of bureaucratic fiscal preferences. Bureaucratic preferences for expansion are distributed along a continuum. A typology of agency heads' expansion preferences is developed and related to Downs's typology of bureaucrats. Data from eight surveys of state agency heads (1964–98) enable us to trace administrators' preferences for expansion over four decades. These preferences vary substantially in any single survey year and reflect trends across these years. Notably, a substantial proportion of agency heads opted for no expansion in their own agency's programs and expenditures or in the state's overall budget. This typology challenges conventional conceptions of bureaucrats' maximizing preferences, advances alternative interpretations about budget minimizing, and fills an important gap in budget and bureaucracy theory
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Economics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Social science · Sociology · State (computer science · Typology · Computer Science · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
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| Obras citantes distintas | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,36 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 8 |