On Constructing a Theory of Grammatical Change
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 7429804 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kersti Börjars (0000-0002-3154-5260, The University of Manchester, autor de correspondencia), Nigel Vincent (0000-0002-2494-1652, The University of Manchester, autor de correspondencia), George Walkden (0000-0001-5950-9686, The University of Manchester, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2015 |
| Volumen | 113 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 363-382 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2015-10-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Transactions of the Philological Society (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0079-1636 • E-ISSN: 1467-968X |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-968x.12068 |
| OpenAlex | W1861458916 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 16 |
| Referencias citadas | 35 |
Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Graeme Trousdale, Constructionalization and Constructional Changes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. pp. xvii + 278. The last few decades have seen the growth of a community of linguists who, though diverse in their beliefs and assumptions about other aspects of linguistics, nevertheless share a commitment to the construction as the basic unit of linguistic analysis. In construction grammar (henceforth CxG), as this family of approaches is known, 'construction' is understood – beyond its pretheoretical sense – as a conventionalized pairing of form and meaning (Booij 2010: 11; Sag 2012: 97; cf. also Goldberg 2006: 5). Varieties of CxG have been deployed in domains as diverse as sentence production (Bencini & Goldberg 2001; Bencini 2013), child language acquisition (Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003; Diessel 2013), computational linguistics (papers in Steels 2012), and the theory of long-distance dependencies (Sag 2010). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, another of these domains is diachronic linguistics. CxG has been used in modelling grammaticalization (Noël 2007; Trousdale 2008; and much subsequent research); in addition, proponents of CxG have argued that it lends itself well to the modelling of actualization due to its conception of linguistic structure as a network of related constructions (de Smet 2012), and that it is well suited to the task of syntactic reconstruction (Barðdal & Eyþórsson 2012). Despite this flurry of interest in historical CxG, there was until recently no book-length treatment of the implications of this grammatical architecture in diachrony, comparable in scope for instance to Lightfoot (1979) for the generative Extended Standard Theory of the time. The volume under review (henceforth T&T) is an attempt to fill this gap: the authors focus on 'developing ways to think about the creation of and the nature of changes in constructions' (p. 1),1 where a construction is understood as a pairing of form and meaning, essentially a Saussurean sign (p. 4). The work is therefore pioneering in terms of its scope and angle, a welcome attempt to provide an overarching framework for diachronic work in CxG. The authors have clearly set themselves an ambitious task. The first chapter of the book sets the stage by introducing the basic notions of CxG and its most influential variants, including the key elements that T&T themselves adopt: here the crucial concept is the distinction between constructionalization (Cxzn) and constructional change (CC), to be discussed in more detail in section 2.1 below. Assuming that form and function may change independently of one another, so that either side of the form-meaning pairing may be altered, T&T suggest that this kind of independent change leads to a mismatch, and that such mismatch is likely over time to be 'resolved' (p. 27). The second chapter is the theoretical heart of the volume, in which they present their framework for understanding change. Chapters 3 and 4 tackle grammaticalization and lexicalization respectively, arguing that both can be subsumed under the notion of constructionalization. The fifth chapter discusses contexts for constructionalization, and the sixth and final chapter provides a brief review and conclusion. The authors illustrate throughout with case studies from the history of English. Regardless of whether or not one accepts the fundamental assumptions of CxG, such a book has the potential to be an immensely valuable contribution to the literature by serving as a reference point for future linguists interested in what the constructional perspective has to offer, including linguists of other persuasions looking for a point of comparison with their own framework. As will become clear, our view is that the volume fails to realize much of this potential, since unfortunately it does not always present an approach that is clear or consistent. In what follows we will focus on what we think are the main shortcomings in this regard. The book's ambitious aim is to lay the groundwork for a theory of change within a constructional approach to language structure and variation. As such, it is essential for the authors to engage with the question of what linguistic 'change' actually is: as they recognize, this is not a trivial issue, since different points of departure may lead to radically different conclusions (see, for instance, Coseriu 1985; Hale 1998; Croft 2000: 4–5 for three divergent perspectives). However, T&T's pronouncements on this issue do not always square with one another. In the introduction they distinguish between innovation, which occurs in the mind of an individual speaker, and change, assuming that '[f]or an innovation to count as change, it must have been replicated across populations of speakers' (p. 2). This is consistent with earlier statements by one of the authors 'that "one swallow doth not a summer make", and one change in the grammar of an individual does not constitute what we think of as a change in "a language"' (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 47). On the face of it, this stance seems intuitive. The problem with it is that it is toothless without a definition of 'population', which T&T do not provide. Are a hundred speakers enough? What about two? A sorites paradox arises. Perhaps the notion of population should be defined with reference to external criteria rather than numerically. But then are the speakers of British English a population? What about the English of a small village? It is tempting to equate populations with speech communities or social networks (as the discussion on p. 46 implies), but these too are not unproblematic notions in themselves (see Hudson 1996; Patrick 2002). This is, of course, a thorny issue for anyone choosing to view 'change' as something which requires spread through a population – and in that sense all historical linguists face the same problem – but given the importance T&T assign to this notion, the reader might reasonably expect some discussion. The real problem, however, is that T&T disregard their own distinction at various points throughout the book. For instance, in their case study of ish (p. 236), they present an example from the web illustrating the use of ish as an adjective meaning 'unsure', and claim on this basis that 'a further change has taken place'. But this is an existence proof, and can surely be taken to demonstrate nothing more than that a construction is used by a single individual (or has been used so, once). Properly speaking, according to their own definition, this is innovation, not change – unless some population is involved, but if so we are not told. T&T are also happy to acknowledge that cognitive mechanisms play a role in 'change' (p. 35). Since these are necessarily active in the individual speaker-hearer rather than at population level, it seems that they really mean 'innovation' here. Similar problems arise when we combine T&T's definition of change with the assumption 'that change is change in usage, and that the locus of change is the construct, an instance of use' (p. 2). A construct, as they define it, is an empirically attested utterance or utterance-part – a token, rather than a type (p. 16).2 But tokens are by definition unique, restricted to a single point in time, and not replicable, especially not across populations of speakers. What is replicable is the abstract type that the token instantiates: in other words, the construction, in T&T's approach, and the frequency associated with it. This is indeed what they seem to have in mind when they state that changes may conventionalize in an 'individual mental network' (p. 46), and that 'change in use' may occur for individual speakers. In the case of "change", a fuzzy everyday term is given more precise content within T&T's theory. That they do not use the term consistently is disappointing, since in the first two chapters they go to great lengths to lay out their terminology and contrast it with that of other scholars. No one would deny that both the innovation of a variant by an individual speaker and the spread of that variant to other speakers are necessary for a full explanation of the phenomenon that we pretheoretically call language change. In this case, however, their terminological – and associated conceptual – distinction generates more heat than light. A further aspect of the pretheoretical conception of 'change' is not treated at all in this book. It is well established that neither innovation nor change, in T&T's sense, is instantaneous; rather, when a new form is innovated, it may gradually replace the old form through a period of competition, including within the usage of individual speaker-hearers. This is a robust finding of variationist sociolinguistics as well as corpus-based historical syntax in the tradition of Kroch (1989). Moreover, the dynamics of such changes are reasonably well understood, in that they tend to follow an S-curve pattern (Denison 2003; Pintzuk 2003; Blythe & Croft 2012). The phenomenon is also well known from the literature on grammaticalization, under the guise of 'layering' (Hopper 1991: 22): 'Within a broad functional domain, new layers are continually emerging. As this happens, the older layers are not necessarily discarded, but may remain to coexist with and interact with the newer layers'. It is clear that T&T are aware of this literature, as shown by their discussion of synchronic variation and its relation to grammaticalization in subsection 3.4.3, for instance, as well as by earlier work by the same authors on gradience and gradualness (Traugott & Trousdale 2010; this is 'social-contextual' gradualness, in their sense). Yet the discussion of individual changes in the book does not include this kind of gradualness. For instance, in their discussion of a lot of, a source construction involving lexical lot is said to be 'neoanalyzed' (their term for the more traditional 'reanalyzed') as a new, more grammatical, micro-construction, implying that the former simply becomes the latter – but the source construction is evidently not lost. Similarly, the going to future, discussed in subsection 5.3.4, has not immediately ousted the will future in English, but rather the two are in competition, at least in certain contexts. While it also seems to be true that going to has spread from a more restricted set of contexts to become more generally used as a future marker (this is 'structural' gradualness, in Traugott & Trousdale's 2010 terms), there is also competition between going to and will for the same contexts. This kind of competition and co-existence seems to us to be vital for understanding the dynamics of change in a network model of grammatical knowledge. One of the most appealing features of the constructional approach laid out by T&T is the conception of constructions as situated in a network. As they note (p. 150), this represents a clear departure from the Bloomfieldian notion of the lexicon as simply a list of irregularities. Rather, all units ranging from affixes to clauses are organized hierarchically within what is called the 'constructicon'. The network model is attractive from a diachronic perspective because, by considering the structure of the constructicon, predictions can in principle be derived about where analogization (a term they prefer to the traditional label 'analogy') as a mechanism is most likely to set in: specifically, where constructions are closest and network ties are strongest.3 Furthermore, 'persistence' effects (Hopper 1991), in which traces of an earlier use can be detected in a grammaticalized unit, can be insightfully captured using inheritance in a network. They set out a hierarchy of constructions which involves three levels: schema, subschema and micro-construction, though these terms are 'a heuristic for description and analysis of constructional change' (p. 16) rather than absolute distinctions.4 'Schematicity' is a way of measuring the degree of abstraction represented by a construction, with a highly schematic construction being of a high degree of abstraction. A schema is then a highly schematic construction, though it is not necessarily fully schematic: 'A fully schematic construction is an abstraction such as N or SAI (subject-auxiliary inversion). Many schemas are, however, partial, by which is meant that they have both substantive and schematic parts' (p. 12). Sub-schemas are less schematic constructions and hence the distinction between schemas and sub-schemas can only be made comparatively. The only constructions that are not (sub-)schemas are those which consist entirely of substantive elements, that is, those which are completely phonologically specified. Constructions are said to be 'instantiations' of the construction above them in the network. They are also described as '(sub-)types', or as a 'subclass' (p.77), of the higher construction, but, most frequently, a less schematic construction is said to be a 'member' of the more schematic construction immediately above it in the network. Two types of relationships between the nodes in the network are identified: relational links and inheritance links. Examples of relational links are metaphorical extension (such as that between motion and change) and polysemy. Relational links are said to be crucial to certain types of priming and 'typically exist between reasonably closely related concepts' (p. 60). Inheritance links exist between a node and all its dominating nodes, such that the former inherits all non-conflicting properties from the latter. Typically, a construction will inherit properties from a number of dominating constructions. After going to some lengths to set out the basics of the network view in chapter 2, T&T present a case study of the way-construction (as in she made her way down the stairs) to illustrate this view. They argue that this construction emerges as a distinct node in the network in the seventeenth century, splitting off from the transitive construction, then later expanding to apply to intransitive verbs as well through analogization to the intransitive construction. Other constructions, such as the resultative construction, are also said to have played a role in its development. What is disappointing, though, is that T&T hardly discuss the structure of the relevant portion of the network explicitly for any of their other case studies. When discussing ALL- and WHAT-pseudo-clefts, for instance, it is only briefly mentioned that they are part of a larger family of cleft constructions (p. 136), and that they inherit properties from the relevant specificational schema. It would have been nice to see more use of network-based reasoning, and more use being made of the two types of links and their role in explaining linguistic change, as this is an area where constructional approaches have the potential to enjoy an advantage in predictive power over other frameworks. The match or mismatch between form and function is central to this approach, and something to which we will return below. In order to establish matches and mismatches, there need to be well-defined criteria for determining what the form is and what the function is and an articulated system of representation of the two aspects of a construction. The criteria for form and function need to be distinct, or else there would be no mismatches. In this, T&T fall somewhat short. The basic representation is as in (1), with F short for Form and M for Meaning. T&T do not outline their approach to representing morpho-syntactic form. There is also no commonly agreed approach to the representation of structure in CxG. The authors provide a concise and helpful account of a number of different approaches which share a commitment to the idea that the basic unit of analysis is a construction. Sign-Based Construction Grammar (SBCG), which is a synthesis of Berkeley Construction Grammar and Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar, has a clearly articulated and explicit representation of both form and function (Boas & Sag 2012). T&T state overtly that this is a system of representation they will not adopt, beyond recognizing that form involves the features SYN, MORPH and PHON, which are the same three aspects of form recognized in T&T's account (p. 4).5 Langacker's Cognitive Grammar does not include a syntactic component, and Cognitive Construction Grammar as represented by Goldberg (1995, 2006) does not articulate assumptions about structure (because it is not relevant to the types of constructions studied). Croft's Radical Construction Grammar has, as may be expected, a radical approach to syntactic structure. Croft takes constructions to be the basic unit, with categories or roles defined by the construction in which they occur, '[h]ence there do not exist global syntactic categories in the grammar of a single language, nor universal categories in a Universal Grammar' (Croft 2001:175). Croft (2001: 175) also 'dispenses with syntactic relations, that is, relations between the syntactic elements of a construction'. There is then no source within the CxG literature referred to which provides us with details of the approach to morpho-syntactic structure and its representation taken by T&T. Instead we have to rely on notions being introduced as we go along, with some reference to the literature, which, as we shall see, does not always clarify matters. The notion of head and the discussion of the development of constructions involving lot will serve to illustrate the lack of clarity around assumptions about structure (pp. 23–9). Though they say that they 'do not seek to be exhaustive' (p. 23), the initial account of the changes that lot has undergone will be 'quite detailed' since the example will be referred to at several points throughout the book. In terms of data, the account is indeed detailed, but in terms of clarifying the terms used, it is disappointing. T&T state that, in its lexical and referential use in Old English, lot is a head and the following of-phrase is a modifier, and that over time a new construction develops in which the noun in the of-phrase takes over the role of head. They provide two representations of the constructionalization involved in the development of lot; (2), which represents only the structural change, and (3), which is T&T's preferred representation (their examples (21) and (22) on p. 25): (2) As evidence of a change in structural head status, T&T cite the examples in (4). They do not distinguish between subject-verb agreement, or concord, exemplified in (5) (their (19), p. 25), and agreement between a noun phrase and a coreferential pronoun, which is what we have in (4). Our conclusion is that the application of headedness criteria by T&T does not help clarify the notion 'head'. Nor do the contrasts they establish with other terms help us. In the initial discussion of the development of a lot of they contrast 'head' with 'modifier', but the latter term is not given explicit content either. If the terms are intended to be interpreted in terms of 'traditional' X-bar theory, with the contrasts head, specifier, modifier and complement, this is not made clear. In their subsequent discussion of the Latin analytic future (p. 122), that which would be a 'head' and its 'complement' in X-bar terms is referred to as 'head' and its 'dependent', using terms associated with dependency grammar, such as Word Grammar (Hudson 1984, 2007), to which reference is made in the discussion of networks. In an attempt to clarify, T&T (p. 25) make specific reference to the literature. They state that the neoanalysis which the head relationship has undergone 'conforms to the essentially synchronic head distinctions proposed in Aarts (1998) and Brems (2003)'. These two approaches to identifying head status are sufficiently different that it is odd to refer to them as both supporting the distinctions made by T&T, and to our minds, not even in combination are they helpful in better understanding T&T's use of 'head'. Brems (2003) is a study of noun phrases similar to the a lot of construction; what she refers to as Measure Nouns in an extended sense, such as bunch of and heaps of. The contrast of interest to Brems is that between 'head' – which applies to both form and function in T&T – and 'quantifier' – a functional notion in T&T. More generally, in her study, the distinction between form and function is not essential, or possibly eliminated. She states: 'In assessing the structural status of the MNs two main types of tests were used, viz. semantic and syntactic ones' (Brems 2003: 293, our emphasis). The semantic criterion identified relates to lexicality and collocational range: '[t]he main guideline here was that the more literal and lexically specific in meaning the MN is, the more likely it will constitute the head of the enclosing NP' and 'as the collocational range of the MN increases, the probability of quantifier status of the MN likewise increases' (Brems 2003: 293). The syntactic criterion recognized by Brems is agreement, but she identifies a number of difficulties with applying this criterion and concludes 'if syntactic criteria converge with semantic indications of head status, they can be taken into account' (Brems 2003: 293). The reference to Brems is then not helpful in giving us an understanding the notion of headedness, the distinction between semantic and syntactic head and the shift in structural head. Aarts (1998), on the other hand, is careful to make the distinction between 'structural' and 'semantic' properties and uses 'syntactic' criteria to establish head status. He uses the six criteria which Hudson (1987) derives from Zwicky (1985), though finds that some of them are not applicable and some inconclusive. Though Aarts uses well-defined criteria, it is not clear how helpful his account is for understanding T&T's representation in (3). Aarts employs the full range of notions of X-bar structure, including not only head and modifier, but also specifier, a term not used by T&T. Aarts looks at what we may term evaluative noun phrases such as an oaf of a man, which though similar in superficial structure a lot of, have different properties. In particular, Aarts provides support for assuming that the first determiner is the specifier of the whole phrase, with oaf of a being a modifier. In T&T's preferred representation reproduced in (3) above, the determiner is not referred to at all, and in (2) it appears to be included in the head in the early construction and in the modifier in the modern use. The analysis proposed by Aarts for the phrases he analyzes would not be appropriate for the modern a lot of goods, since a is singular and goods is plural; however, in the original the determiner would have been the specifier of lot and hence this means another structural change is involved, as illustrated in (9). Given that there is explicit comment on of ('There has also been neoanalysis of the preposition of as a phonological part of the quantifier', p. 25), it is odd not to have any mention of the structural change involving the determiner. T&T argue that a lot of in (3) 'has to be learned as a non-compositional unit', while at the same time having 'a degree of analyzability' (notions to which we return in section 2.2 below), and as evidence they provide the example in (10a), where an adjective occurs inside what is in their terms a quantifier. However, the matter is more complicated, since a modifier in this position can also modify the second noun as in (10b) and (10c). Facts such as these form a serious challenge to anyone's account of the structure of the modern use of a lot of, but it seems this interesting complexity is brushed off a little too easily here. As the book's title suggests, the distinction between constructional change (CC) and constructionalization (Cxzn) is crucial to their approach, with Cxzn being in a sense the more significant.11 Cxzn results when both form and function change, according to T&T thereby yielding a new construction and a new node in the network. When the result is a micro-construction, the change can be either abrupt or gradual, in the sense of consisting of micro-steps. Words such as Romnesia and ebrary are provided as examples of an abrupt Cxzn resulting in a new micro-construction. When the Cxzn results in a new schematic construction, the change is always gradual. CC, on the other hand, involves a change affecting only 'one internal dimension of a construction' (p. 26), form or function, but not both. In T&T's view, this does not give rise to a new construction. The reason why the distinction between Cxzn and CC is so important and why change to both form and function has privileged status is not quite clear. By way of explanation for the greater significance of Cxzn for an account of linguistic change, T&T state 'The new pairing of both meaning and form is a new unit or sign. It is therefore a change to the system, i.e. a type/node change. We can see its results in data when constructs begin to be attested which could not have been sanctioned by pre-existing constructional types' (p. 22). It may be that we are confused by the terminology here, with the distinction between 'unit', 'sign' and 'constructional type' not being clearly defined. However, would it not be the case also for CC that the new construct would not be sanctioned by the existing construction? Even a change to either form or function would surely mean that the construction involving the older form or function no longer sanctions the new construct. T&T's general account of change, as outlined above in section 1, implies that a change in one dimension tends to be followed by a change in the other, to restore the match between the two dimensions, hence Cxzn could be considered a more complete change than CC. However, constructions resulting from CC only can be quite stable. Börjars and Burridge (2011), for instance, argue that the Pennsylvania German fer underwent a change in function several hundred years ago, but that there has been no change to its structural position. As Dahl (2001: 102) puts it: 'the grammaticalization process may halt for a long time, maybe several centuries. In fact, many complexities of grammar are due to such halted processes of grammaticalization'. A further issue that arises in an approach that makes the distinction between Cxzn and CC so important is the fact that the distinction does not appear to be that easy to draw. Let us consider the distinction between Cxzn and CC in a little more detail. T&T recognize that CC may precede or follow Cxzn, as illustrated in (11) (their (24), p 28). They point out that the existence of 'pre-constructionalization constructional change' can only be posited once the Cxzn has occurred. In this representation, Cxzn appears to be an alternative to CC, and this seems to be confirmed by their subsequent discussion. T&T acknowledge that 'observed constructionalization can be seen to have arisen from a number of small local changes in the context ... and we can with hindsight call these changes pre-constructionalizations' (p. 29). As an example they give the 'development of uses of lot that mean "unit" or "group", and of ambiguous constructs' (p. 29). Presumably the 'small local changes' are instances of CC: the change to lot meaning 'unit' or 'group' is presumably a change to the function of the construction and hence an instance of CC, even though that term is not used by T&T in this particular discussion. These small steps are clearly assumed to precede or follow Cxzn, not form part of it. This means that we can represent this in a little more detail as in (12), ignoring any possible change that may occur to form and function in complete synchrony. (12) In this approach, A and B would be the same construction since only Cxzn gives rise to a new construction. The step B > C in (12) would involve Cxzn, because at this point both form and function have changed and we have a new construction. However, the assumption that B > C constitutes the point of Cxzn relies on the starting point for the development being drawn immediately before Construction A. Given the nature of language change, it can be difficult to draw that precise a starting point for a change. There may well be an earlier stage to the change in (12), so that (13) is a more appropriate representation. (13) By including an earlier stage of the construction, we now have a change to both dimensions having taken place earlier, by the time Construction B results. This would appear to leave C as an example of post-contructionalization CC, with B and C now being the same construction. However, if we take A into account, then we could still argue that B > C is a second instance of Cxzn. Taking more seriously the claim that Cxzn consists of – rather than is preceded and/or followed by – a series of small steps we get the representation in (14) instead of (12). (14) However, this is still on the assumption that we can draw a precise starting point for the Cxzn. Assuming a change as represented in (13), we would still be left with an issue of whether this is an instance of two overlapping Cxzns or one more complex one. The concerns we raise here may seem to be based on too rigid a view of the progress of linguistic change. We do recognize that the modelling of linguistic change will always involve a level of abstraction, but if a distinction between Cxzn and CC is made in this way and given the importance that T&T assign to it, then it would seem appropriate for them to have offered some discussion of these issues. It should also be noted that if we assume a situation in which the process of Cxzn can be clearly distinguished from pre-Cxzn and post-Cxzn CCs, then these could only involve changes to the same dimension, so that in (14), any instances of pre-Cxz
Construction Grammar · Grammaticalization · Historical linguistics · Universal Grammar · Linguistic Variation and Morphology · Phonetics and Phonology Research · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
Entrevista com Elizabeth Closs Traugott e Graeme Trousdale
Mudança linguística em perspectiva construcionista
Interview with Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Graeme Trousdale
English comparative modals and their complements
Construct types in language change
Intersubjectification in constructional change
Asymmetries, mismatches and construction grammar
Scaffolding the sentential Ultimate construction into a word
The development of the Chinese copula shì construction
Grammaticalization vs. Diachronic Construction Grammar
The development of the Chinese V de O cleft construction
A study of the development of the Chinese correlative comparative construction from the perspective of constructionalization
A constructional account of the development of the Chinese stance discourse marker běnlái
From movement into action to manner of causation
Semantic dilution in the extension of complex and schematic constructions
All-cleft constructions in the London-Lund Corpora of spoken English
The Oxford Guide to the Romance Languages
The Routledge Handbook of Historical Linguistics
The Oxford Handbook of Construction Grammar
Language, Usage and Cognition
Grammaticalization
Syntactic Change
On some principles of grammaticization
A construction based analysis of child directed speech
The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality
From preposition to purposive to infinitival marker
Diachronic construction grammar and grammaticalization theory
Sociolinguistics
Measure Noun constructions
Reflexes of grammar in patterns of language change
Heads
Zwicky on heads
Radical Construction Grammar
Construction Morphology
Diachronic Syntax
S-curves and the mechanisms of propagation in language change
The course of actualization
English filler-gap constructions
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