Evolutionary Psychology and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8399334
AutoresRichard J Samuels (0000-0003-1490-8194, University of Pennsylvania, autor de correspondencia), Richard Samuels
Año1998
Volumen49
Número4
Páginas575-602
Fecha de publicación1998-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/49.4.575
OpenAlexW2339585436
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas40
Referencias citadas24

In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architecture—including the part that subserves ‘central processing’ —is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mechanisms or ‘modules’. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show that the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for this general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to prefer it to a competing picture of the mind which I call the Library Model of Cognition. Second, I argue that this alternative model is compatible with the central theoretical and methodological commitments of evolutionary psychology. Thus I argue that, at present, the endorsement of the Massive Modularity Hypothesis by evolutionary psychologists is both unwarranted and unmotivated.

Biology · Cognition · Cognitive architecture · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Domain (mathematical analysis) · Domain specificity · Epistemology · Evolutionary biology · Evolutionary psychology · Evolutionary theory · Modularity (biology) · Architecture · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Language and cultural evolution · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology