Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9706729
AutoresWerner Güth (0000-0002-6810-6720, Universität Hamburg), Stefan Napel (0000-0002-7116-6441, Universität Hamburg)
Año2006
Volumen116
Número514
Páginas1037-1056
Fecha de publicación2006-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01122.x
OpenAlexW2066505040
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas23

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environment comprising different games which - studied in isolation - yield opposite implications. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the definition of inequality aversion as well as on agents' ability to discriminate between games. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006

Adaptation (eye · Divergence (linguistics · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Inequality · Inequity aversion · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Risk aversion (psychology · Variety (cybernetics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology