Competing for Attention
Is the Showiest Also the Best
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9708324 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Paola Manzini (0000-0001-5474-0512, University of St Andrews and IZA), Marco Mariotti (0000-0002-5308-5154, Queen Mary University of London) |
| Año | 2018 |
| Volumen | 128 |
| Número | 609 |
| Páginas | 827-844 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2018-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12425 |
| OpenAlex | W1589088470 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 20 |
There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between quality and salience
Cognitive psychology · Economics · Epistemology · Externality · Imperfect · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Quality (philosophy · Salience (neuroscience · Salient · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,5 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |