Exiting a Lawless State

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9714735
AutoresKarla Hoff (World Bank), Joseph E Stiglitz (0000-0001-6149-046X, Columbia University and NBER)
Año2008
Volumen118
Número531
Páginas1474-1497
Fecha de publicación2008-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02177.x
OpenAlexW2089319276
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas51

An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2008

Asset (computer security · Computer security · Economics · Law and economics · Operations management · Pareto principle · Political science · Rule of law · State (computer science · Stripping (fiber · Transition (genetics · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Chemistry · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Engineering · Law