Karla Hoff
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 299380 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Karla Hoff |
| NOMBRES | Karla |
| APELLIDO | Hoff |
| FIRMA | HOFF K |
| AFILIACIONES | World Bank |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 119 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1990 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
The Whys of Social Exclusion
All over the world, people are prevented from participating fully in society through mechanisms that go beyond the structural and institutional barriers that rational choice theory identifies (—poverty, exclusion by law or force, taste-based or statistical discrimination, and externalities from social networks differentiated by socioeconomic status). This paper discusses four additional mechanisms that can be explained by bounded rationality: (a)…
The Making of Behavioral Development Economics
A core insight of behavioral economics is that we are “fast thinkers”; very little human thinking resembles the rational, deliberate type that charac-terizes homo economicus. What is less well recognized is that our innate reliance on cognitive shortcuts means that mental models—categories, concepts, narratives, and worldviews—profoundly influence our decision making by unconsciously shaping what we perceive and the “toolbox” of strategies we dra…
The Whys of Social Exclusion
All over the world, people are prevented from participating fully in society through mechanisms that go beyond the structural and institutional barriers identified by rational choice theory (poverty, exclusion by law or force, taste-based and statistical discrimination, and externalities from social networks). This essay discusses four additional mechanisms that bounded rationality can explain: (i) implicit discrimination, (ii) self-stereotyping …
“Small Miracles”—Behavioral Insights to Improve Development Policy
One of the most fruitful advances in modern economics has been the introduction of psychological realism into the model of "economic man." The World Development Report 2015 organizes the evidence about how humans actually think and make decisions into a coherent framework useful for designing development policy. This paper elaborates on the three principles of human thinking that constitute the report's intellectual framework: Human thinking is d…
Making up people—The effect of identity on performance in a modernizing society
Making up People- The Effect of Identity on Preferences and Performance in a Modernizing Society
It is typically assumed that being hard-working or clever is a trait of the person, in the sense that it is always there, in a fixed manner. However, in an experiment with almost 600 boys in India, cues to one's place in the traditional caste order turn out to influence the expression of these traits. The experiment assigned students to different treatments with respect to the salience of caste and had them solve mazes under incentives. It turned…
Poverty Traps
Much popular belief--and public policy--rests on the idea that those born into poverty have it in their power to escape. But the persistence of poverty and ever-growing economic inequality around the world have led many economists to seriously question the model of individual economic self-determination when it comes to the poor. In Poverty Traps , Samuel Bowles, Steven Durlauf, Karla Hoff, and the book's other contributors argue that there are m…
Caste and Punishment
Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. Here we study how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy – the caste system – affectsnindividuals’ willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although we control for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low caste individua…
Introduction
Journal Article Introduction: Tastes, Castes and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferences Get access Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Karla Hoff Karla Hoff World Bank Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 121, Issue 556, November 2011, Pages F396–F412, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.…
Government turnover
While government turnover is often thought of as an adverse source of instability, it may also be viewed as a favourable source of competition and institution‐building. To articulate and test such hypotheses, this article describes two main concepts of government turnover: leadership turnover, or change in rulers, and ideological turnover, or change in the rulers' ideology. Refinements involve the mode, outcome and timing of turnover. The article…
Political Alternation As A Restraint On Investing In Influence
"The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies tha…
Exiting a Lawless State
An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the tr…
Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable Inequalities
What are the mechanisms by which societal discrimination affects individual achievement, and why do the effects of past discrimination endure once legal barriers are removed? We report the findings of two experiments in village India that suggest that the mechanisms of discrimination operate, in part, within the individuals who are members of the groups who have been discriminated against. We demonstrate that publicly revealing an individual’s me…
The Kin System as a Poverty Trap
"An institution found in many traditional societies is the extended family system (kin system), an informal system of shared rights and obligations among extended family for the purpose of mutual assistance. In predominantly non-market economies, the kin system is a valuable institution providing critical community goods and insurance services in the absence of market or public provision. But what happens when the market sector grows in the proce…
The Creation Of The Rule Of Law And The Legitimacy Of Property Rights
"How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. We show that …
Moneylenders and bankers
In many areas of the world, a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision. We present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs, motivated by studies of rural credit markets. We show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition, increasing prices or inducing exit. Higher prices (interest rates) result from the loss of scale econom…
Moneylenders and bankers
Local suppliers of credit in the Third World, 1750–1960
Market Failures and the Distribution of Wealth
Introduction
Karla Hoff, Joseph E. Stiglitz; Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets—Puzzles and Policy Perspectives, The World Bank Economic Review, Vo
Caste and Punishment
Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. Here we study how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy – the caste system – affectsnindividuals’ willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although we control for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low caste individua…
Introduction
Journal Article Introduction: Tastes, Castes and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferences Get access Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Karla Hoff Karla Hoff World Bank Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 121, Issue 556, November 2011, Pages F396–F412, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.…
Government turnover
While government turnover is often thought of as an adverse source of instability, it may also be viewed as a favourable source of competition and institution‐building. To articulate and test such hypotheses, this article describes two main concepts of government turnover: leadership turnover, or change in rulers, and ideological turnover, or change in the rulers' ideology. Refinements involve the mode, outcome and timing of turnover. The article…
Moneylenders and bankers
Making up people—The effect of identity on performance in a modernizing society
Moneylenders and bankers
In many areas of the world, a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision. We present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs, motivated by studies of rural credit markets. We show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition, increasing prices or inducing exit. Higher prices (interest rates) result from the loss of scale econom…
Exiting a Lawless State
An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the tr…
Market Failures and the Distribution of Wealth
Introduction
Karla Hoff, Joseph E. Stiglitz; Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets—Puzzles and Policy Perspectives, The World Bank Economic Review, Vo
Local suppliers of credit in the Third World, 1750–1960
Market Failures and the Distribution of Wealth
Moneylenders and bankers
Moneylenders and bankers
In many areas of the world, a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision. We present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs, motivated by studies of rural credit markets. We show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition, increasing prices or inducing exit. Higher prices (interest rates) result from the loss of scale econom…
The Kin System as a Poverty Trap
"An institution found in many traditional societies is the extended family system (kin system), an informal system of shared rights and obligations among extended family for the purpose of mutual assistance. In predominantly non-market economies, the kin system is a valuable institution providing critical community goods and insurance services in the absence of market or public provision. But what happens when the market sector grows in the proce…
The Creation Of The Rule Of Law And The Legitimacy Of Property Rights
"How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. We show that …
Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable Inequalities
What are the mechanisms by which societal discrimination affects individual achievement, and why do the effects of past discrimination endure once legal barriers are removed? We report the findings of two experiments in village India that suggest that the mechanisms of discrimination operate, in part, within the individuals who are members of the groups who have been discriminated against. We demonstrate that publicly revealing an individual’s me…
Political Alternation As A Restraint On Investing In Influence
"The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies tha…
Exiting a Lawless State
An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This article looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The article identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the tr…
Government turnover
While government turnover is often thought of as an adverse source of instability, it may also be viewed as a favourable source of competition and institution‐building. To articulate and test such hypotheses, this article describes two main concepts of government turnover: leadership turnover, or change in rulers, and ideological turnover, or change in the rulers' ideology. Refinements involve the mode, outcome and timing of turnover. The article…
Poverty Traps
Much popular belief--and public policy--rests on the idea that those born into poverty have it in their power to escape. But the persistence of poverty and ever-growing economic inequality around the world have led many economists to seriously question the model of individual economic self-determination when it comes to the poor. In Poverty Traps , Samuel Bowles, Steven Durlauf, Karla Hoff, and the book's other contributors argue that there are m…
Caste and Punishment
Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. Here we study how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy – the caste system – affectsnindividuals’ willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although we control for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low caste individua…
Introduction
Journal Article Introduction: Tastes, Castes and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferences Get access Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Karla Hoff Karla Hoff World Bank Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 121, Issue 556, November 2011, Pages F396–F412, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.…
Making up People- The Effect of Identity on Preferences and Performance in a Modernizing Society
It is typically assumed that being hard-working or clever is a trait of the person, in the sense that it is always there, in a fixed manner. However, in an experiment with almost 600 boys in India, cues to one's place in the traditional caste order turn out to influence the expression of these traits. The experiment assigned students to different treatments with respect to the salience of caste and had them solve mazes under incentives. It turned…
Making up people—The effect of identity on performance in a modernizing society
“Small Miracles”—Behavioral Insights to Improve Development Policy
One of the most fruitful advances in modern economics has been the introduction of psychological realism into the model of "economic man." The World Development Report 2015 organizes the evidence about how humans actually think and make decisions into a coherent framework useful for designing development policy. This paper elaborates on the three principles of human thinking that constitute the report's intellectual framework: Human thinking is d…
The Whys of Social Exclusion
All over the world, people are prevented from participating fully in society through mechanisms that go beyond the structural and institutional barriers identified by rational choice theory (poverty, exclusion by law or force, taste-based and statistical discrimination, and externalities from social networks). This essay discusses four additional mechanisms that bounded rationality can explain: (i) implicit discrimination, (ii) self-stereotyping …
The Whys of Social Exclusion
All over the world, people are prevented from participating fully in society through mechanisms that go beyond the structural and institutional barriers that rational choice theory identifies (—poverty, exclusion by law or force, taste-based or statistical discrimination, and externalities from social networks differentiated by socioeconomic status). This paper discusses four additional mechanisms that can be explained by bounded rationality: (a)…
The Making of Behavioral Development Economics
A core insight of behavioral economics is that we are “fast thinkers”; very little human thinking resembles the rational, deliberate type that charac-terizes homo economicus. What is less well recognized is that our innate reliance on cognitive shortcuts means that mental models—categories, concepts, narratives, and worldviews—profoundly influence our decision making by unconsciously shaping what we perceive and the “toolbox” of strategies we dra…
Economics (17 obras) · Political science (14 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Psychology (8 obras) · Sociology (7 obras) · Income, Poverty, and Inequality (6 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Politics (6 obras) · Social Psychology (6 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (5 obras)