Gualtiero Piccinini
Biographic Data
| ID | 1000794 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gualtiero Piccinini |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gualtiero |
| FAMILY NAME | Piccinini |
| SIGNATURE | PICCININI G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri–St. Louis |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0825-9071 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 217 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Concepts at the Interface
In Concepts at the Interface, Nick Shea integrates a wide range of empirical and theoretical literatures in psychology, neuroscience, and machine learning to offer a bold, systematic, and largely plausible account of concepts. He argues that concepts are “labels” that can be freely combined within working memory to conduct “content-general” reasoning, yet they also function as “plug-and-play devices” that interface with widely distributed bodies …
Knowing that as knowing how: A neurocognitive practicalism
We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to represent the fact that P , ground such a representation in the fact that P , use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how. More precisely, agents acquire knowledge via…
Neurocognitive Mechanisms: Explaining Biological Cognition
This book provides the foundations for a neurocomputational explanation of cognition based on contemporary cognitive neuroscience. An ontologically egalitarian account of composition and realization, according to which all levels are equally real, is defended. Multiple realizability and mechanisms are explicated in light of this ontologically egalitarian framework. A goal-contribution account of teleological functions is defended, and so is a mec…
The Evolution of Psychological Altruism
We argue that there are two different kinds of altruistic motivation: classical psychological altruism, which generates ultimate desires to help other organisms at least partly for those organisms’ sake, and nonclassical psychological altruism, which generates ultimate desires to help other organisms for the sake of the organism providing the help. We then argue that classical psychological altruism is adaptive if the desire to help others is int…
The cognitive neuroscience revolution
Mechanistic Abstraction
We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstraction play the ontic role of identifying the specific complex components, subsets of causal powers, and …
Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account
Computation permeates our world, but a satisfactory philosophical theory of what it is has been lacking. Gualtiero Piccinini presents a mechanistic account of what makes a physical system a computing system. He argues that computation does not entail representation or information-processing, although information-processing entails computation
Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning …
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: Functional analyses as mechanism sketches
The Physical Church–Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold
This article defends a modest version of the Physical Church-Turing thesis (CT). Following an established recent trend, I distinguish between what I call Mathematical CT—the thesis supported by the original arguments for CT— and Physical CT. I then distinguish between bold formulations of Physical CT, according to which any physical process—anything doable by a physical system—is computable by a Turing machine, and modest formulations, according …
Two Kinds of Concept: Implicit and Explicit
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Computation vs. information processing: Why their difference matters to cognitive science
The Resilience of Computationalism
Computationalism—the view that cognition is computation—has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X . According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y , and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this article, I …
The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism: The Mind as Neural Software
Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosop…
Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant …
Computationalism, The Church–Turing Thesis, and the Church–Turing Fallacy
Computing Mechanisms
This paper offers an account of what it is for a physical system to be a computing mechanism—a system that performs computations. A computing mechanism is a mechanism whose function is to generate output strings from input strings and (possibly) internal states, in accordance with a general rule that applies to all relevant strings and depends on the input strings and (possibly) internal states for its application. This account is motivated by re…
Computational explanation in neuroscience
Splitting Concepts
A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: ( a ) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to expla…
The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at Mcculloch and Pitts's “Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity”
Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states
Epistemic divergence and the publicity of scientific methods
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: Functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Computing Mechanisms
This paper offers an account of what it is for a physical system to be a computing mechanism—a system that performs computations. A computing mechanism is a mechanism whose function is to generate output strings from input strings and (possibly) internal states, in accordance with a general rule that applies to all relevant strings and depends on the input strings and (possibly) internal states for its application. This account is motivated by re…
The cognitive neuroscience revolution
Mechanistic Abstraction
We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstraction play the ontic role of identifying the specific complex components, subsets of causal powers, and …
The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism: The Mind as Neural Software
Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosop…
Splitting Concepts
A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: ( a ) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to expla…
Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning …
Computational explanation in neuroscience
The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at Mcculloch and Pitts's “Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity”
Computation vs. information processing: Why their difference matters to cognitive science
Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant …
Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states
The Physical Church–Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold
This article defends a modest version of the Physical Church-Turing thesis (CT). Following an established recent trend, I distinguish between what I call Mathematical CT—the thesis supported by the original arguments for CT— and Physical CT. I then distinguish between bold formulations of Physical CT, according to which any physical process—anything doable by a physical system—is computable by a Turing machine, and modest formulations, according …
Epistemic divergence and the publicity of scientific methods
Two Kinds of Concept: Implicit and Explicit
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Computationalism, The Church–Turing Thesis, and the Church–Turing Fallacy
Epistemic divergence and the publicity of scientific methods
The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at Mcculloch and Pitts's “Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity”
Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states
Computational explanation in neuroscience
Splitting Concepts
A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: ( a ) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to expla…
Computationalism, The Church–Turing Thesis, and the Church–Turing Fallacy
Computing Mechanisms
This paper offers an account of what it is for a physical system to be a computing mechanism—a system that performs computations. A computing mechanism is a mechanism whose function is to generate output strings from input strings and (possibly) internal states, in accordance with a general rule that applies to all relevant strings and depends on the input strings and (possibly) internal states for its application. This account is motivated by re…
Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant …
Computation vs. information processing: Why their difference matters to cognitive science
The Resilience of Computationalism
Computationalism—the view that cognition is computation—has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X . According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y , and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this article, I …
The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism: The Mind as Neural Software
Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosop…
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: Functional analyses as mechanism sketches
The Physical Church–Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold
This article defends a modest version of the Physical Church-Turing thesis (CT). Following an established recent trend, I distinguish between what I call Mathematical CT—the thesis supported by the original arguments for CT— and Physical CT. I then distinguish between bold formulations of Physical CT, according to which any physical process—anything doable by a physical system—is computable by a Turing machine, and modest formulations, according …
Two Kinds of Concept: Implicit and Explicit
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning …
Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account
Computation permeates our world, but a satisfactory philosophical theory of what it is has been lacking. Gualtiero Piccinini presents a mechanistic account of what makes a physical system a computing system. He argues that computation does not entail representation or information-processing, although information-processing entails computation
The cognitive neuroscience revolution
Mechanistic Abstraction
We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstraction play the ontic role of identifying the specific complex components, subsets of causal powers, and …
The Evolution of Psychological Altruism
We argue that there are two different kinds of altruistic motivation: classical psychological altruism, which generates ultimate desires to help other organisms at least partly for those organisms’ sake, and nonclassical psychological altruism, which generates ultimate desires to help other organisms for the sake of the organism providing the help. We then argue that classical psychological altruism is adaptive if the desire to help others is int…
Neurocognitive Mechanisms: Explaining Biological Cognition
This book provides the foundations for a neurocomputational explanation of cognition based on contemporary cognitive neuroscience. An ontologically egalitarian account of composition and realization, according to which all levels are equally real, is defended. Multiple realizability and mechanisms are explicated in light of this ontologically egalitarian framework. A goal-contribution account of teleological functions is defended, and so is a mec…
Knowing that as knowing how: A neurocognitive practicalism
We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to represent the fact that P , ground such a representation in the fact that P , use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how. More precisely, agents acquire knowledge via…
Concepts at the Interface
In Concepts at the Interface, Nick Shea integrates a wide range of empirical and theoretical literatures in psychology, neuroscience, and machine learning to offer a bold, systematic, and largely plausible account of concepts. He argues that concepts are “labels” that can be freely combined within working memory to conduct “content-general” reasoning, yet they also function as “plug-and-play devices” that interface with widely distributed bodies …
Psychology (17 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Cognitive science (13 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (11 works) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (10 works) · Cognition (9 works) · Metaphysics (9 works) · Philosophy of mind (7 works)