Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind

Bibliographic Data

ID4079585
AuthorsGualtiero Piccinini (0000-0002-0825-9071, University of Missouri–St. Louis, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume4
Issue3
Pages515-532
Publication date2009-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x
OpenAlexW2024372151
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited59

Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done

Cognitive science · Computational theory of mind · Embodied cognition · Epistemology · Mainstream · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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