Dongsoo Shin
Biographic Data
| ID | 10038496 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dongsoo Shin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dongsoo |
| FAMILY NAME | Shin |
| SIGNATURE | SHIN D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Santa Clara University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4022-9091 |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A 3 month nutrition and exercise program improved hallux strength among senior daycare center users in Korea
Introduction: With a growing aging population, the focus on the health and well-being of older adults, especially in preventing falls, becomes crucial. This 3 month study, initiated in July 2022, aimed to assess the impact of a nutrition and exercise program in senior daycare centers in Chuncheon, South Korea. Methods: A 3 month study, beginning in July 2022, included 204 older adults from 10 senior daycare centers in Chuncheon, South Korea. Rand…
Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern
This paper provides an economic rationale for overachieving behavior in nonprofessional activities in the labor market. The intrinsically motivated worker uses his achievement in nonprofessional activity to signal his work ethic. When the worker's career concern is weak, he exerts no extra effort on nonprofessional activity.When the worker's career concern is strong, however, his effort level for the nonprofessional activity can go beyond the bli…
Limited Communication and Responsibility Budgeting
We consider an agency model with three-tier hierarchy, in which the principal cannot observe the manager's and the worker's task environments. Communication is limited in that only the manager can report to the principal about the task environments. The principal decides whether or not to give the manager responsibility for project budgeting. Under responsibility budgeting, the manager receives all of the resources for the project tasks and share…
Collusion and Outcome Equivalency
This paper considers a principal-agent model with adverse selection, in which collusion among the agents is possible. We compare the optimal outcome in two cases: (i) the principal can perfectly discriminate the transfers to the agents, and (ii) the principal's power to discriminate the transfers to the agents is limited. We find that the principal's payoff is not affected by limitation on transfer discrimination.
Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
We compare rigid and flexible organizations when side contracting among agents is possible. Within a rigid organization, each agent can produce only one component of the final product, whereas within a flexible organization, the agents can reallocate their tasks during the production period. In our model, the principal can only observe the joint output produced by the agents. Our analysis reveals that within a flexible organization, side transfer…
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Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
We compare rigid and flexible organizations when side contracting among agents is possible. Within a rigid organization, each agent can produce only one component of the final product, whereas within a flexible organization, the agents can reallocate their tasks during the production period. In our model, the principal can only observe the joint output produced by the agents. Our analysis reveals that within a flexible organization, side transfer…
Collusion and Outcome Equivalency
This paper considers a principal-agent model with adverse selection, in which collusion among the agents is possible. We compare the optimal outcome in two cases: (i) the principal can perfectly discriminate the transfers to the agents, and (ii) the principal's power to discriminate the transfers to the agents is limited. We find that the principal's payoff is not affected by limitation on transfer discrimination.
Limited Communication and Responsibility Budgeting
We consider an agency model with three-tier hierarchy, in which the principal cannot observe the manager's and the worker's task environments. Communication is limited in that only the manager can report to the principal about the task environments. The principal decides whether or not to give the manager responsibility for project budgeting. Under responsibility budgeting, the manager receives all of the resources for the project tasks and share…
Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern
This paper provides an economic rationale for overachieving behavior in nonprofessional activities in the labor market. The intrinsically motivated worker uses his achievement in nonprofessional activity to signal his work ethic. When the worker's career concern is weak, he exerts no extra effort on nonprofessional activity.When the worker's career concern is strong, however, his effort level for the nonprofessional activity can go beyond the bli…
A 3 month nutrition and exercise program improved hallux strength among senior daycare center users in Korea
Introduction: With a growing aging population, the focus on the health and well-being of older adults, especially in preventing falls, becomes crucial. This 3 month study, initiated in July 2022, aimed to assess the impact of a nutrition and exercise program in senior daycare centers in Chuncheon, South Korea. Methods: A 3 month study, beginning in July 2022, included 204 older adults from 10 senior daycare centers in Chuncheon, South Korea. Rand…
Computer Science (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Accounting (1 work) · Adverse selection (1 work) · Applied Psychology (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Balance, Gait, and Falls Prevention (1 work)