Collusion and Outcome Equivalency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24044710 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dongsoo Shin (0000-0002-4022-9091, Santa Clara University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 164 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 449-459 |
| Publication date | 2008-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245608785363425 |
| OpenAlex | W2012789084 |
| Language | EN |
This paper considers a principal-agent model with adverse selection, in which collusion among the agents is possible. We compare the optimal outcome in two cases: (i) the principal can perfectly discriminate the transfers to the agents, and (ii) the principal's power to discriminate the transfers to the agents is limited. We find that the principal's payoff is not affected by limitation on transfer discrimination.
Adverse selection · Collusion · Computer security · Economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory) · Principal (computer security) · Principal–agent problem · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Stochastic game · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Highly cited | No |
|---|