Jakub Rudnicki
Biographic Data
| ID | 1004277 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jakub Rudnicki |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jakub |
| FAMILY NAME | Rudnicki |
| SIGNATURE | RUDNICKI J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warsaw |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0222-9370 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Do Linguistic Data Really Support Continuism about Remembering and Imagining
Assertoric content, lies, and slips of the tongue
In this paper, I introduce a new theory of assertoric content. By ‘theory’, I mean both an extensionally correct definition and an elucidation of the mechanisms underlying assertoric content. In agreement with some existing work on the topic, I contend that assertoric content spans several content categories and is possibly constituted by an utterance’s standing content and explicature. I also offer a detailed explanation of how and why assertori…
Semantic conventions and referential intentions
According to intentionalism, the semantic reference of the uses of demonstratives is fixed, at least partly, by the speaker’s referential intention. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of the existence of a semantic convention of this sort. My argument is placed in the Lewisian framework of signaling games and consists of several steps that correspond to four anti-intentionalist arguments, already present in the literature, that have p…
Don’t be deceived
The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that prima facie look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conc…
A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’
Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves anal…
Can the reference of a use of "That" change? Assessing non-standard approaches to the semantics of demonstratives
Centred Propositions, What is Asserted, and Communication
In recent years there has been a heated debate on how to accommodate John Perry's observations about the essentiality of indexicality into our models of linguistic communication. This article is an attempt at providing a new perspective on this issue. I argue that we should jettison two elements taken for granted by the views I present, and criticize, here: no centring , uncentring , recentring and multicentring . These elements are: (1) taking t…
Don’t be deceived
The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that prima facie look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conc…
A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’
Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves anal…
Can the reference of a use of "That" change? Assessing non-standard approaches to the semantics of demonstratives
Centred Propositions, What is Asserted, and Communication
In recent years there has been a heated debate on how to accommodate John Perry's observations about the essentiality of indexicality into our models of linguistic communication. This article is an attempt at providing a new perspective on this issue. I argue that we should jettison two elements taken for granted by the views I present, and criticize, here: no centring , uncentring , recentring and multicentring . These elements are: (1) taking t…
Semantic conventions and referential intentions
According to intentionalism, the semantic reference of the uses of demonstratives is fixed, at least partly, by the speaker’s referential intention. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of the existence of a semantic convention of this sort. My argument is placed in the Lewisian framework of signaling games and consists of several steps that correspond to four anti-intentionalist arguments, already present in the literature, that have p…
Don’t be deceived
The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that prima facie look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conc…
A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’
Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves anal…
Can the reference of a use of "That" change? Assessing non-standard approaches to the semantics of demonstratives
Assertoric content, lies, and slips of the tongue
In this paper, I introduce a new theory of assertoric content. By ‘theory’, I mean both an extensionally correct definition and an elucidation of the mechanisms underlying assertoric content. In agreement with some existing work on the topic, I contend that assertoric content spans several content categories and is possibly constituted by an utterance’s standing content and explicature. I also offer a detailed explanation of how and why assertori…
Do Linguistic Data Really Support Continuism about Remembering and Imagining
Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)