Don’t be deceived

Bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions

Bibliographic Data

ID10807325
AuthorsJakub Rudnicki (0000-0003-0222-9370, University of Warsaw, corresponding author), Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (0000-0001-7838-5666, University of Warsaw)
Year2023
Volume201
Issue6
Pages192-192
Publication date2023-05-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-023-04180-9
PMID37274613
OpenAlexW4378377665
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited35

The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that prima facie look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conception by suggesting that the existing analyses of the phenomenon overlook a non-obvious category of hearers whom the speakers of bald-faced lies intend to deceive. Those hearers are institutions represented by the people involved, such as courts or secret police. We also criticize two recent rival accounts (Jessica Keiser’s and Daniel Harris’s) that attempt to save the traditional conception by saying that some bald-faced lies are not assertions, because they are conventional—rather than illocutionary—speech acts

Assertion · Epistemology · Linguistics · Lying · Metaphysics · Phenomenon · Philosophy of language · Prima facie · Computer Science · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access