Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Benjamin Eva

Biographic Data

ID1004638
NAMEBenjamin Eva
GIVEN NAMESBenjamin
FAMILY NAMEEva
SIGNATUREEVA B
AFFILIATIONSDuke University
ORCID0000-0002-3764-3398
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS17
AUTHOR COUNT13
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX3
  • Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets

    Open Access•Richard Stern, Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2025

    Some authors maintain that we can use causal Bayes nets to infer whether $X \to Y$ or $X \leftarrow Y$ by consulting a probability distribution defined over some exogenous source of variation for $X$ or $Y$ . We raise a problem for this approach. Specifically, we point out that there are cases where an exogenous cause of $X$ ( ${E_x}$ ) has no probabilistic influence on $Y$ no matter the direction of causation—namely, cases where ${E_x} \to X \to…

  • Spanning and Spacing: Commentary on ‘New Possibilities for Fair Algorithms’

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Technology•2024

  • Comparative Learning

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2024

    This article concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgments , that is, judgments of the form “I am at least as confident in $p$ as I am in $q$ .” Specifically, it identifies, characterizes, and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called comparative conditionalization that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgments in the face of novel evidence

  • Anti-reductionist Interventionism

    Richard Stern, Reuben Stern et al.•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 3•References: 30

    Kim's causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim's conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward's (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusi…

  • Four Approaches to Supposition

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear et al.•ARTICLE•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2022

    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. There are also two types of judgments that may be initiated by suppositions of either sort: qualitative (binary) judgments and quantitative (numerical) ones. The former are judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable and the latter are about how acceptable it is. We systematically explicate the relationships between canonical representatives of each of the …

  • Comparative opinion loss

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022•References: 1

    It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opini…

  • Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2022•Cited by: 6

  • Reasoning in physics

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•References: 4

    The way in which philosophers have thought about the scientific method and the nature of good scientific reasoning over the last few centuries has been consistently and heavily influenced by the examples set by physics. The astounding achievements of 19th and 20th century physics demonstrated that physicists had successfully identified methodologies and reasoning patterns that were uniquely well suited to discovering fundamental truths about the …

  • The Logic of Conditional Belief

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2020•References: 17

    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is…

  • A-symmetric confirmation and anthropic skepticism

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•References: 16

  • The Similarity of Causal Structure

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2019•References: 8

    Whether y obtains under the counterfactual supposition that x is thought to depend on whether y obtains in the most similar world(s) in which x obtains. Graphical causal models have proved useful in developing a principled notion of similarity between worlds, but this notion is limited insofar as it does not apply to counterfactual suppositions about causal structure. Here, we explore the possibility of filling this lacuna by introducing a notion…

  • Causal Explanatory Power

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern et al.•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2019•Cited by: 7•References: 11

    Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this vari…

  • Topos Theoretic Quantum Realism

    Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2017•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    Topos quantum theory (TQT) is standardly portrayed as a kind of ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum mechanics.1 In this article, I study the extent to which TQT can really be characterized as a realist formulation of the theory, and examine the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by TQT satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for a realist reformulation of quantum theory. Specifi…

  • Causal Explanatory Power

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern et al.•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2019•Cited by: 7•References: 11

    Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this vari…

  • Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2022•Cited by: 6

  • Anti-reductionist Interventionism

    Richard Stern, Reuben Stern et al.•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 3•References: 30

    Kim's causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim's conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward's (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusi…

  • Topos Theoretic Quantum Realism

    Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2017•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    Topos quantum theory (TQT) is standardly portrayed as a kind of ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum mechanics.1 In this article, I study the extent to which TQT can really be characterized as a realist formulation of the theory, and examine the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by TQT satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for a realist reformulation of quantum theory. Specifi…

  • Topos Theoretic Quantum Realism

    Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2017•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    Topos quantum theory (TQT) is standardly portrayed as a kind of ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum mechanics.1 In this article, I study the extent to which TQT can really be characterized as a realist formulation of the theory, and examine the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by TQT satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for a realist reformulation of quantum theory. Specifi…

  • A-symmetric confirmation and anthropic skepticism

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•References: 16

  • The Similarity of Causal Structure

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2019•References: 8

    Whether y obtains under the counterfactual supposition that x is thought to depend on whether y obtains in the most similar world(s) in which x obtains. Graphical causal models have proved useful in developing a principled notion of similarity between worlds, but this notion is limited insofar as it does not apply to counterfactual suppositions about causal structure. Here, we explore the possibility of filling this lacuna by introducing a notion…

  • Causal Explanatory Power

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern et al.•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2019•Cited by: 7•References: 11

    Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this vari…

  • The Logic of Conditional Belief

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2020•References: 17

    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is…

  • Reasoning in physics

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•References: 4

    The way in which philosophers have thought about the scientific method and the nature of good scientific reasoning over the last few centuries has been consistently and heavily influenced by the examples set by physics. The astounding achievements of 19th and 20th century physics demonstrated that physicists had successfully identified methodologies and reasoning patterns that were uniquely well suited to discovering fundamental truths about the …

  • Four Approaches to Supposition

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear et al.•ARTICLE•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2022

    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. There are also two types of judgments that may be initiated by suppositions of either sort: qualitative (binary) judgments and quantitative (numerical) ones. The former are judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable and the latter are about how acceptable it is. We systematically explicate the relationships between canonical representatives of each of the …

  • Comparative opinion loss

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva, Richard Stern•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022•References: 1

    It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opini…

  • Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Public Affairs•2022•Cited by: 6

  • Anti-reductionist Interventionism

    Richard Stern, Reuben Stern et al.•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•2023•Cited by: 3•References: 30

    Kim's causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim's conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward's (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusi…

  • Spanning and Spacing: Commentary on ‘New Possibilities for Fair Algorithms’

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy & Technology•2024

  • Comparative Learning

    Open Access•Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2024

    This article concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgments , that is, judgments of the form “I am at least as confident in $p$ as I am in $q$ .” Specifically, it identifies, characterizes, and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called comparative conditionalization that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgments in the face of novel evidence

  • Causal Direction in Causal Bayes Nets

    Open Access•Richard Stern, Benjamin Eva•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2025

    Some authors maintain that we can use causal Bayes nets to infer whether $X \to Y$ or $X \leftarrow Y$ by consulting a probability distribution defined over some exogenous source of variation for $X$ or $Y$ . We raise a problem for this approach. Specifically, we point out that there are cases where an exogenous cause of $X$ ( ${E_x}$ ) has no probabilistic influence on $Y$ no matter the direction of causation—namely, cases where ${E_x} \to X \to…

Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Physics (3 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae