Comparative Learning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705692 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benjamin Eva (0000-0002-3764-3398, Duke University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-17 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/psa.2023.99 |
| OpenAlex | W4387782846 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
This article concerns the diachronic rationality norms for comparative confidence judgments , that is, judgments of the form “I am at least as confident in $p$ as I am in $q$ .” Specifically, it identifies, characterizes, and evaluates an intuitively compelling learning rule called comparative conditionalization that specifies how agents should revise their comparative confidence judgments in the face of novel evidence
Comparative method · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Linguistics · Rationality · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology
Language, truth and logic
Decision Theory as Philosophy
Justifying Conditionalization
A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Eternal inflation
Maximum entropy inference as a special case of conditionalization
The problem of representing incompletely ordered doxastic systems
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
Pragmatic Considerations on Comparative Probability
Regularity and Hyperreal Credences
Comparative opinion loss
Bayesian Conditionalisation and the Principle of Minimum Information
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |