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Decision Theory as Philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID23397646
AuthorsMark Kaplan (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, corresponding author)
Year1996
Publication date1996-01-26
Open AccessYes
TypeBOOK
VenueDecision Theory As Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/cbo9780511804847
OpenAlexW2076686715
Open LibraryOL34479480M
ISBN9780511804847
LanguageEN
Citations received94

Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise.

Bayesian probability · Business decision mapping · Causal decision theory · Criticism · Decision analysis · Decision theory · Epistemology · Evidential reasoning approach · Legitimacy · Mathematical economics · Panacea (medicine) · Philosophy of science · Political science · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Decision making · Decision making, moral and ethical aspects · Moral and ethical aspects

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Unique citing works94
Citations per year2,54
Citation span1989 - 2026 (38)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 85

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