Decision Theory as Philosophy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23397646 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Kaplan (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Publication date | 1996-01-26 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Decision Theory As Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/cbo9780511804847 |
| OpenAlex | W2076686715 |
| Open Library | OL34479480M |
| ISBN | 9780511804847 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 94 |
Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise.
Bayesian probability · Business decision mapping · Causal decision theory · Criticism · Decision analysis · Decision theory · Epistemology · Evidential reasoning approach · Legitimacy · Mathematical economics · Panacea (medicine) · Philosophy of science · Political science · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Decision making · Decision making, moral and ethical aspects · Moral and ethical aspects
Modelling Epistemic Systems
Philosophy as a Unifying Discipline
Reification as dependence on extrinsic information
The biosemiosis of prescriptive information
Belief, credence, and faith
Comparative Learning
Bayesianism without the Black Box
To What Must an Epistemology be True
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Cognitive Science
Rationales Handeln/Rationalität bei Weber und Esset im Vergleich
Justice In-Between
Putting Logic in its Place
Belief, credence, and norms
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
Interpreting imprecise probabilities
Must rational intentions maximize utility
How To Read a Representor
Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization
Credence
Acting on belief functions
On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism
Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism
Justification and the knowledge-connection
Rethinking the credal basis of rational judgment and suspension
The case for comparability
Fragmentation and logical omniscience
Suspending belief in credal accounts
Doxastic gradualism without credences
The Problem of Ignorance
Epistemic Justification
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs
Rebooting the new evidence scholarship
Authentic faith and acknowledged risk
Probing the mind of God
Against Deductive Closure
The Doxastic Zoo
Scotching Dutch Books
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
Consequences of comparability
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge
Risky belief
Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility
Comparative opinion loss
Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence
Epistemic Values and Information Management
Probabilifying reflective equilibrium
Belief and contextual acceptance
Sleeping beauty should be imprecise
Formal schemas of induction as models
Factivity, consistency and knowability
Cut-off points for the rational believer
A bitter pill for closure
Vague Credence
Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith
Individual values and inductive risk
What should we believe about the future
The Lottery
Respecting evidence
Belief without credence
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
Belief, credence, and evidence
Social norms and the traditional deterrence game
Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement
In defense of modest probabilism
Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership
Assertion, belief, and context
Uncertainty, equality, fraternity
Faith is weakly positive
A normatively adequate credal reductivism
Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences
How can belief be akratic
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Distention for Sets of Probabilities
A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation
Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist
Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief
Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision
Epistemology of Disagreement
Delta-type senior civil service for the 21 st century
Two Forms of Inconsistency in Quantum Foundations
What Evidence Do You Have
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence
Epistemology Quantized
A Bayesian Paradox
Constraints on Rational Theory Choice
Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence
The relationship between belief and credence
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
| Unique citing works | 94 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,54 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2026 (38) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 85 |