Rebooting the new evidence scholarship
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12596197 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John R Welch (0000-0001-8820-7150, Saint Louis University-Madrid Campus, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 351-373 |
| Publication date | 2020-08-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The International Journal of Evidence & Proof (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1365-7127 • E-ISSN: 1740-5572 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1365712720943329 |
| OpenAlex | W3048419657 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 69 |
The new evidence scholarship addresses three distinct approaches: legal probabilism, Bayesian decision theory and relative plausibility theory. Each has major insights to offer, but none seems satisfactory as it stands. This paper proposes that relative plausibility theory be modified in two substantial ways. The first is by defining its key concept of plausibility, hitherto treated as primitive, by generalising the standard axioms of probability. The second is by complementing the descriptive component of the theory with a normative decision theory adapted to legal process. Because this version of decision theory is based on plausibilities rather than probabilities, it generates plausibilistic expectations as outputs. Because these outputs are comparable, they function as relative plausibilities. Hence the resulting framework is an extension of relative plausibility theory, but it retains deep ties to legal probabilism, through the proposed definition of plausibility, and to Bayesian decision theory, through the normative use of decision theory
Axiom · Bayesian probability · Decision theory · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Normative · Political science · Scholarship · Statistics · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics · Philosophy · Artificial Intelligence
The will to believe
Decisions and Revisions
From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism
Decision Theory as Philosophy
The Probable and The Provable
Betting on Theories
A Definition of Subjective Probability
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
Trial by Mathematics
Common problems of plausibility and probabilism
Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion
Strange Bedfellows
Relative plausibility and its critics
On the limitations of a unitary model of the proof process
Can there be a burden of the best explanation
Challenges for comparative fact-finding
The nature of juridical proof
It’s all relative
The limitations of relative plausibility theory
Plausibility and probability in juridical proof
Assessing theories, Bayes style
New tools for theory choice and theory diagnosis
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process
An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence
Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data
Tyche and Athena
Ethics and the Logic of Decision
Naked statistical evidence of liability
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence
Evidence evaluation in complex decision making
Foundations of Evidence Law
Rethinking Evidence
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |