Common problems of plausibility and probabilism

Bibliographic Data

ID12596207
AuthorsMaggie Wittlin (University of Nebraska College of Law, Nebraska, USA, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume23
Issue1-2
Pages184-190
Publication date2018-12-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe International Journal of Evidence & Proof (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1365-7127 • E-ISSN: 1740-5572
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1365712718815349
OpenAlexW2907367462
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited8

In this response to Allen and Pardo’s Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, I argue that while relative plausibility presents certain advantages over probabilism, it also fails to avoid several problems that the authors attribute to probabilism. I note that relative plausibility can be understood as probabilism under certain constraints that characterise a typical trial. I then argue that two of Allen and Pardo’s central problems with probabilism—the absence of an objective means for measuring the strength of evidence and the conjunction problem—apply to both probabilism and relative plausibility, although neither problem poses a serious threat to accuracy. I conclude that each theory, despite these problems, is useful for certain purposes—relative plausibility better models how advocates present cases and how jurors process information; probabilism serves as a valuable tool for modelling relevance and prejudice

Epistemology · Political science · Prejudice (legal term · Process (computing · Relevance (law · Computer Science · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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