Constraints on Rational Theory Choice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397361 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarah Bradley (0000-0001-9663-7919, Munich School of Philosophy, corresponding author), Seamus Bradley |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 639-661 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axv063 |
| OpenAlex | W2344954975 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 19 |
In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a view of scientific rationality gives a precise interpretation of what Thomas Kuhn thought. 1 Introduction2 Okasha’s Argument3 Rationality Can Be Silent4 Arrow Undermined5 The Informational-Basis Escape6 Theory Choice at the Level of the Individual Scientist7 Kuhn Vindicated8 Trade-offs and Partial Commensurability9 Conclusion
Argument (complex analysis) · Arrow · Ecological rationality · Economics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Philosophy of science · Positive economics · Rational choice theory (criminology) · Rationality · Scientific theory · Sociology · Voluntarism (philosophy) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Decision Theory as Philosophy
Maximization and the Act of Choice
The Division of Cognitive Labor
Learning to live with voluntarism
An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
The Empirical Stance
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2024 (7) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |