Jin-Ying Dai
Biographic Data
| ID | 10054619 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jin-Ying Dai |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jin-Ying |
| FAMILY NAME | Dai |
| SIGNATURE | DAI J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Fudan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9107-1933 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Epidemic-Behavior Coevolutionary Vaccination Game Dynamics Under Prospect Theory
Many studies assume that individuals are perfectly rational or only update vaccination strategies at the end of each transmission season, without considering differences in individual perceptions and behaviors. This article proposes a novel coevolutionary model that integrates subjective perceptions with social interactions, where individuals update vaccination strategies within the same transmission season. The coevolutionary model effectively c…
Imperfect Vaccination Evolutionary Game Incorporating Individual Social Difference and Subjective Perception
Previous studies have focused on the assumption that individual attitudes toward epidemics, epidemic-related information, and vaccination are identical with much less effort attempting to consider psychological factors and individual heterogeneity. In this article, we employ a two-layer susceptible–infected–recovered–vaccinated/unaware–aware–unaware (SIRV-UAU) coupled network to depict the interplay between epidemic spreading and information diff…
No prominent works on this page.
Imperfect Vaccination Evolutionary Game Incorporating Individual Social Difference and Subjective Perception
Previous studies have focused on the assumption that individual attitudes toward epidemics, epidemic-related information, and vaccination are identical with much less effort attempting to consider psychological factors and individual heterogeneity. In this article, we employ a two-layer susceptible–infected–recovered–vaccinated/unaware–aware–unaware (SIRV-UAU) coupled network to depict the interplay between epidemic spreading and information diff…
Epidemic-Behavior Coevolutionary Vaccination Game Dynamics Under Prospect Theory
Many studies assume that individuals are perfectly rational or only update vaccination strategies at the end of each transmission season, without considering differences in individual perceptions and behaviors. This article proposes a novel coevolutionary model that integrates subjective perceptions with social interactions, where individuals update vaccination strategies within the same transmission season. The coevolutionary model effectively c…
Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Evolutionarily stable strategy (2 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Vaccination (2 works) · Biology (1 work) · Coevolution (1 work)