Imperfect Vaccination Evolutionary Game Incorporating Individual Social Difference and Subjective Perception
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22107192 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cong Li (0009-0002-7711-7277, Fudan University), Jin-Ying Dai (0000-0002-9107-1933, Fudan University), Xiang Li (0000-0001-6509-2709, Tongji University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 2369-2382 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2329-924X • E-ISSN: 2373-7476 |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1109/tcss.2023.3271894 |
| OpenAlex | W4376607719 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 44 |
Previous studies have focused on the assumption that individual attitudes toward epidemics, epidemic-related information, and vaccination are identical with much less effort attempting to consider psychological factors and individual heterogeneity. In this article, we employ a two-layer susceptible–infected–recovered–vaccinated/unaware–aware–unaware (SIRV-UAU) coupled network to depict the interplay between epidemic spreading and information diffusion. We propose an imperfect vaccination evolutionary game model integrating prospect theory (PT) to explore the effect of individual subjective perception and social difference on epidemic spreading and vaccination equilibrium. We find that the individual social difference in the epidemic spreading layer has a more significant impact on the epidemic threshold than that in the information diffusion layer. Individual psychological perception and vaccination behavior decision-making determine the vaccination equilibrium: under the PT, vaccination equilibrium increases with the decrease of the rationality coefficient when the vaccination cost is small. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of social differences on individual vaccination behavior decision-making and find that vaccination equilibrium increases with the increase of social reinforcement strength and primary protective probability. Finally, we discuss the effect of infection cost on vaccination equilibrium when the infection cost of vaccinated individuals is less than that of unvaccinated individuals and observe that a small infection cost helps improve the vaccination equilibrium
Cognitive psychology · Economics · Evolutionarily stable strategy · Evolutionary game theory · Game theory · Microeconomics · Perception · Perfect information · Vaccination · Computer Science · COVID-19 epidemiological studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Medicine · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social Psychology · Immunology
Infectious Diseases of Humans
The Probability Weighting Function
The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network Experiment
Herd Immunity
Prospect Theory
Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
Perception Effect in Evolutionary Vaccination Game Under Prospect-Theoretic Approach
Social distance monitoring framework using deep learning architecture to control infection transmission of Covid-19 pandemic
The efficacy of social distance and ventilation effectiveness in preventing Covid-19 transmission
Epidemic Spreading in a Social Network With Facial Masks Wearing Individuals
On Evolutionary Vaccination Game in Activity-Driven Networks
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |