Ugo Troiano
Biographic Data
| ID | 1006463 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ugo Troiano |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ugo |
| FAMILY NAME | Troiano |
| SIGNATURE | TROIANO U |
| AFFILIATIONS | Copenhagen Business School |
| ORCID | 0009-0007-1667-2265 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 100 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Old and Young Politicians
We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations
Do Fiscal Rules Matter?
Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after an…
What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil
What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil
Old and Young Politicians
We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations
Do Fiscal Rules Matter?
Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after an…
What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil
Old and Young Politicians
We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations
Economics (2 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (2 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 works) · Demographic economics (1 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (1 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (1 works) · Gender Politics and Representation (1 works) · Incentive (1 works) · Labour economics (1 works)