Harold Langsam
Biographic Data
| ID | 1007769 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Harold Langsam |
| GIVEN NAMES | Harold |
| FAMILY NAME | Langsam |
| SIGNATURE | LANGSAM H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Virginia |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6983-2380 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The will as joy-bringer
The apparent consensus among Nietzsche interpreters is that Nietzsche accepts Schopenhauer’s ‘description of the ubiquity of suffering’ (Gemes, K. 2008. ‘Nietzsche and the Affirmation of Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster.’ European Journal of Philosophy 16: 459–466). In this paper, I argue against this consensus. Specifically, Nietzsche holds that life is not as painful as Schopenhauer makes it out to be, for Nietzsche recogni…
The Sellarsian dilemma and McDowell’s solution to it
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies
The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness (adverbialism) (Section 1). I consider an argument suggested by the work of A. D. Smith that the existence of certain kinds of perceptual constancies shows that adverbialism is correct, for only adverbialism can account for such constancies (Section 3)…
Taking Skepticism Seriously
Two kinds of a priori justification
McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge
Nietzsche and value creation
For Nietzsche, the creation of value is of such great importance because it is the only means by which value can come to exist in the world. In this paper, I examine Nietzsche’s views about how value is created. For Nietzsche, value is created through valuing, and in section ‘Valuing’, I provide a Nietzschean account of valuing. Specifically, I argue that those who share Nietzsche’s view that there are no objective values can value things by repr…
Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions
In recent years philosophers such as Paul Boghossian, David Velleman and Colin McGinn have argued against the view that colours are dispositional properties, on the grounds that they do not look like dispositional properties, and in particular that they are not represented in visual experience as dispositions to present certain kinds of appearances. Rather colours are represented as being these appearances, i.e., simple, non‐dispositional propert…
Mental Reality
Risks and Wrongs
Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation
1. The recent philosophical literature bears ample testimony to the current popularity of regularity analyses of causation.1 In this paper, I offer no opinion as to the philosophical worth of these analyses. In fact, such an opinion would be extremely difficult to render, for the worth of an analysis can only be evaluated with respect to the philosophical problems it is supposed to solve, and, unfortunately, much of the philosophical literature o…
Two kinds of a priori justification
McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge
Nietzsche and value creation
For Nietzsche, the creation of value is of such great importance because it is the only means by which value can come to exist in the world. In this paper, I examine Nietzsche’s views about how value is created. For Nietzsche, value is created through valuing, and in section ‘Valuing’, I provide a Nietzschean account of valuing. Specifically, I argue that those who share Nietzsche’s view that there are no objective values can value things by repr…
Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation
1. The recent philosophical literature bears ample testimony to the current popularity of regularity analyses of causation.1 In this paper, I offer no opinion as to the philosophical worth of these analyses. In fact, such an opinion would be extremely difficult to render, for the worth of an analysis can only be evaluated with respect to the philosophical problems it is supposed to solve, and, unfortunately, much of the philosophical literature o…
Risks and Wrongs
Mental Reality
Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions
In recent years philosophers such as Paul Boghossian, David Velleman and Colin McGinn have argued against the view that colours are dispositional properties, on the grounds that they do not look like dispositional properties, and in particular that they are not represented in visual experience as dispositions to present certain kinds of appearances. Rather colours are represented as being these appearances, i.e., simple, non‐dispositional propert…
Nietzsche and value creation
For Nietzsche, the creation of value is of such great importance because it is the only means by which value can come to exist in the world. In this paper, I examine Nietzsche’s views about how value is created. For Nietzsche, value is created through valuing, and in section ‘Valuing’, I provide a Nietzschean account of valuing. Specifically, I argue that those who share Nietzsche’s view that there are no objective values can value things by repr…
McDowell’s infallibilism and the nature of knowledge
Two kinds of a priori justification
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies
The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness (adverbialism) (Section 1). I consider an argument suggested by the work of A. D. Smith that the existence of certain kinds of perceptual constancies shows that adverbialism is correct, for only adverbialism can account for such constancies (Section 3)…
Taking Skepticism Seriously
The will as joy-bringer
The apparent consensus among Nietzsche interpreters is that Nietzsche accepts Schopenhauer’s ‘description of the ubiquity of suffering’ (Gemes, K. 2008. ‘Nietzsche and the Affirmation of Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster.’ European Journal of Philosophy 16: 459–466). In this paper, I argue against this consensus. Specifically, Nietzsche holds that life is not as painful as Schopenhauer makes it out to be, for Nietzsche recogni…
The Sellarsian dilemma and McDowell’s solution to it
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works)