Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21702879 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Harold Langsam (0000-0001-6983-2380, University of Virginia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 74-85 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976 |
| OpenAlex | W4385274200 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 31 |
The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness (adverbialism) (Section 1). I consider an argument suggested by the work of A. D. Smith that the existence of certain kinds of perceptual constancies shows that adverbialism is correct, for only adverbialism can account for such constancies (Section 3). I respond on behalf of the naïve realist that naïve realism is compatible with the existence of such constancies, so long as naïve realism adopts the view that sensory colors are relational properties of physical objects, not intrinsic properties (Section 4). In other words, the naïve realist should adopt the theory of appearing (Section 5)
Consciousness · Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Realism · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |