Brian Weatherson
Biographic Data
| ID | 1013736 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brian Weatherson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brian |
| FAMILY NAME | Weatherson |
| SIGNATURE | WEATHERSON B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Brown University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0830-141X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 117 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Epistemic Permissivism and Symmetric Games
Akrasia and traitors
Bar Luzon argues that akrasia is irrational because it leads to violating a principle called Avoid Treachery. In response, I argue that Avoid Treachery is insufficiently motivated, that it presupposes a picture of rational inference that defenders of akrasia have independent reason to reject, and that there are models in which Avoid Treachery is false
Normative Externalism
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one’s own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty …
Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress
Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular a…
Games, Beliefs and Credences
Peer reviewed
Explanation, Idealisation and the Goldilocks Problem
Epistemic Modality
In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
Conditionals and indexical relativism
Attitudes and Relativism
Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a…
The Asymmetric Magnets Problem
There are many controversial theses about intrinsicness and duplication. The first aim of this paper is to introduce a puzzle that shows that two of the uncontroversial sounding ones can’t both be true. The second aim is to suggest that the best way out of the puzzle requires sharpening some distinctions that are too frequently blurred, and adopting a fairly radical reconception of the ways things are. 1. Two Theses about Duplication In all of Da…
Epistemic Modals in Context
In the 1970s David Lewis argued for a contextualist treatment of modals (Lewis, 1976, 1979a). Although Lewis was primarily interested in modals connected with freedom and metaphysical possibility, his arguments for contextualism could easily be taken to support contextualism about epistemic modals. In the 1990s Keith DeRose argued for just that position (DeRose, 1991, 1998). In all contextualist treatments, the method by which the contextual vari…
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against E…
Prankster's Ethics
What Good are Counterexamples?
Many Many Problems
Supervaluationist solutions to ‘the problem of the many’ typically rely on two principles. First, the root of the problem is that singular terms can be vague, just as predicates can be. Secondly, the same resolution as the supervaluationist suggests for puzzles with vague predicates will resolve puzzles concerning vague singular terms. In recent years this second principle has been attacked from a number of fronts: it has been claimed that superv…
Are You a Sim
Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose content is unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom's argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false; on the third it does not entail the conclusion;…
Real Conditionals
Book Review| October 01 2002 Real Conditionals William G. Lycan, Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 223. Brian Weatherson Brian Weatherson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 609–611. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-609 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Brian Weatherson; Real Conditionals. T…
Real Conditionals
Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles
Three objections have recently been levelled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
In any plausible semantics for conditionals, the semantics for indicatives and subjunctives will resemble each other closely. This means that if we are to keep the possible‐worlds semantics for subjunctives suggested by Lewis, we need to find a possible‐worlds semantics for indicatives. One reason for thinking that this will be impossible is the behaviour of rigid designators in indicatives. An indicative like ‘If the stuff in the rivers, lakes a…
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment
Games, Beliefs and Credences
Peer reviewed
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against E…
Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles
Three objections have recently been levelled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
In any plausible semantics for conditionals, the semantics for indicatives and subjunctives will resemble each other closely. This means that if we are to keep the possible‐worlds semantics for subjunctives suggested by Lewis, we need to find a possible‐worlds semantics for indicatives. One reason for thinking that this will be impossible is the behaviour of rigid designators in indicatives. An indicative like ‘If the stuff in the rivers, lakes a…
Many Many Problems
Supervaluationist solutions to ‘the problem of the many’ typically rely on two principles. First, the root of the problem is that singular terms can be vague, just as predicates can be. Secondly, the same resolution as the supervaluationist suggests for puzzles with vague predicates will resolve puzzles concerning vague singular terms. In recent years this second principle has been attacked from a number of fronts: it has been claimed that superv…
Explanation, Idealisation and the Goldilocks Problem
The Asymmetric Magnets Problem
There are many controversial theses about intrinsicness and duplication. The first aim of this paper is to introduce a puzzle that shows that two of the uncontroversial sounding ones can’t both be true. The second aim is to suggest that the best way out of the puzzle requires sharpening some distinctions that are too frequently blurred, and adopting a fairly radical reconception of the ways things are. 1. Two Theses about Duplication In all of Da…
In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress
Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular a…
Attitudes and Relativism
Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a…
Are You a Sim
Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose content is unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom's argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false; on the third it does not entail the conclusion;…
Conditionals and indexical relativism
Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles
Three objections have recently been levelled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy
Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
In any plausible semantics for conditionals, the semantics for indicatives and subjunctives will resemble each other closely. This means that if we are to keep the possible‐worlds semantics for subjunctives suggested by Lewis, we need to find a possible‐worlds semantics for indicatives. One reason for thinking that this will be impossible is the behaviour of rigid designators in indicatives. An indicative like ‘If the stuff in the rivers, lakes a…
Real Conditionals
Book Review| October 01 2002 Real Conditionals William G. Lycan, Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 223. Brian Weatherson Brian Weatherson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 609–611. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-609 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Brian Weatherson; Real Conditionals. T…
Real Conditionals
What Good are Counterexamples?
Many Many Problems
Supervaluationist solutions to ‘the problem of the many’ typically rely on two principles. First, the root of the problem is that singular terms can be vague, just as predicates can be. Secondly, the same resolution as the supervaluationist suggests for puzzles with vague predicates will resolve puzzles concerning vague singular terms. In recent years this second principle has been attacked from a number of fronts: it has been claimed that superv…
Are You a Sim
Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose content is unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom's argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false; on the third it does not entail the conclusion;…
Prankster's Ethics
Epistemic Modals in Context
In the 1970s David Lewis argued for a contextualist treatment of modals (Lewis, 1976, 1979a). Although Lewis was primarily interested in modals connected with freedom and metaphysical possibility, his arguments for contextualism could easily be taken to support contextualism about epistemic modals. In the 1990s Keith DeRose argued for just that position (DeRose, 1991, 1998). In all contextualist treatments, the method by which the contextual vari…
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against E…
The Asymmetric Magnets Problem
There are many controversial theses about intrinsicness and duplication. The first aim of this paper is to introduce a puzzle that shows that two of the uncontroversial sounding ones can’t both be true. The second aim is to suggest that the best way out of the puzzle requires sharpening some distinctions that are too frequently blurred, and adopting a fairly radical reconception of the ways things are. 1. Two Theses about Duplication In all of Da…
Attitudes and Relativism
Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a…
Conditionals and indexical relativism
Epistemic Modality
In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
Explanation, Idealisation and the Goldilocks Problem
Games, Beliefs and Credences
Peer reviewed
Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress
Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular a…
Normative Externalism
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one’s own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty …
Akrasia and traitors
Bar Luzon argues that akrasia is irrational because it leads to violating a principle called Avoid Treachery. In response, I argue that Avoid Treachery is insufficiently motivated, that it presupposes a picture of rational inference that defenders of akrasia have independent reason to reject, and that there are models in which Avoid Treachery is false
Epistemic Permissivism and Symmetric Games
Philosophy (16 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (14 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (13 works) · Citation (7 works) · Library science (7 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Linguistics (5 works)