Thomas Hofweber
Biographic Data
| ID | 1016210 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Hofweber |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Hofweber |
| SIGNATURE | HOFWEBER T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7095-6559 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Alien Structure
Inescapable Concepts
It seems to be impossible to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world merely from our concepts or our language alone. After all, our concepts alone only concern how we aim to represent the world, not how the world in fact is. In this paper I argue that this is mistaken. We can sometimes draw substantial metaphysical conclusions simply from thinking about how we represent the world. But by themselves such conclusions can be flawed if the conc…
Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality
Do human beings have a special and distinguished place in reality? In this book Thomas Hofweber defends that they do. We are special, since there is an intimate connection between our human minds and reality itself. Hofweber thus defends a form of idealism, in particular one which holds that our human minds constrain, but do not construct, reality as the totality of facts. Reality as the totality of facts is thus not independent of our minds, and…
The unrevisability of logic
Can it ever be rational to revise one's own logic by one's own lights? In this paper I argue that logic is never rationally revisable, even if one's own logic gives rise to paradoxes and allows one to derive any conclusion whatsoever. Instead of revising logic, we need to revise a certain widely held position in the philosophy of logic, one tied to the standard conception of validity and to the alleged monotonicity of deductive reasoning. I devel…
Making Things Up
Karen Bennett's book defends the layered picture of reality: some things are more fundamental than others. And as a book in metaphysics, it takes these layers to be of metaphysical significance. But contrary to what others sympathetic to this picture would say, metaphysics is not distinctly concerned with the bottom layer—what is most fundamental—nor is there a single notion of priority that underlies this layered structure, as those would have i…
Conceptual Idealism Without Ontological Idealism
Idealism in its strong form is the view that our human minds in particular, not just minds in general, are metaphysically central to reality, somehow. This chapter presents an argument for this strong form of idealism. The argument will come largely from the philosophy of language, which might sound dubious. However, it will be shown that such an argument can establish a substantial metaphysical conclusion nonetheless. One key move is to distingu…
Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
A number of important philosophical problems are closely connected to questions in ontology. For example, to make progress in the philosophy of arithmetic, one needs to come to terms with whether there are natural numbers, whether such things exist. To make progress on these problems, one also needs to make progress on the ontological questions they are connected to. However, ontology is rather puzzling as a philosophical discipline. It is unclea…
Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig
Précis of Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
Dickie's Epistemic Theory of Reference
Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
How to Endure
The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a di…
Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics
There is a long history of worrying about whether or not metaphysics is a legitimate philosophical discipline. Traditionally such worries center around issues of meaning and epistemological concerns. Do the metaphysical questions have any meaning? Can metaphysical methodology lead to knowledge? But these questions are, in my opinion, not as serious as they have sometimes (historically) been taken to be. What is much more concerning is another set…
Deflating Existential Consequence
Book Review| July 01 2007 Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism Jody Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. viii + 241 pp. Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 465–467. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-006 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedI…
Schiffer's New Theory of Propositions
Conceptions of Truth
Book Review| January 01 2005 Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne, Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 493. Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 136–138. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-136 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitte…
Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic
Research Article| April 01 2005 Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 179–225. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-179 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Thomas Hofweber; Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic. The Philosophical Review 1 Apri…
A Subject with No Object
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. A Subject Wi…
Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic
Research Article| April 01 2005 Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 179–225. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-179 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Thomas Hofweber; Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic. The Philosophical Review 1 Apri…
A Subject with No Object
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. A Subject Wi…
How to Endure
The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a di…
Schiffer's New Theory of Propositions
Conceptions of Truth
Book Review| January 01 2005 Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne, Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 493. Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 136–138. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-136 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitte…
A Subject with No Object
Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. A Subject Wi…
Conceptions of Truth
Book Review| January 01 2005 Conceptions of Truth Wolfgang Künne, Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 493. Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 136–138. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-136 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitte…
Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic
Research Article| April 01 2005 Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 179–225. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-179 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Thomas Hofweber; Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic. The Philosophical Review 1 Apri…
Schiffer's New Theory of Propositions
Deflating Existential Consequence
Book Review| July 01 2007 Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism Jody Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. viii + 241 pp. Thomas Hofweber Thomas Hofweber Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 465–467. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-006 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedI…
Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics
There is a long history of worrying about whether or not metaphysics is a legitimate philosophical discipline. Traditionally such worries center around issues of meaning and epistemological concerns. Do the metaphysical questions have any meaning? Can metaphysical methodology lead to knowledge? But these questions are, in my opinion, not as serious as they have sometimes (historically) been taken to be. What is much more concerning is another set…
How to Endure
The terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’ are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a di…
Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig
Précis of Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
Dickie's Epistemic Theory of Reference
Conceptual Idealism Without Ontological Idealism
Idealism in its strong form is the view that our human minds in particular, not just minds in general, are metaphysically central to reality, somehow. This chapter presents an argument for this strong form of idealism. The argument will come largely from the philosophy of language, which might sound dubious. However, it will be shown that such an argument can establish a substantial metaphysical conclusion nonetheless. One key move is to distingu…
Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
A number of important philosophical problems are closely connected to questions in ontology. For example, to make progress in the philosophy of arithmetic, one needs to come to terms with whether there are natural numbers, whether such things exist. To make progress on these problems, one also needs to make progress on the ontological questions they are connected to. However, ontology is rather puzzling as a philosophical discipline. It is unclea…
Making Things Up
Karen Bennett's book defends the layered picture of reality: some things are more fundamental than others. And as a book in metaphysics, it takes these layers to be of metaphysical significance. But contrary to what others sympathetic to this picture would say, metaphysics is not distinctly concerned with the bottom layer—what is most fundamental—nor is there a single notion of priority that underlies this layered structure, as those would have i…
The unrevisability of logic
Can it ever be rational to revise one's own logic by one's own lights? In this paper I argue that logic is never rationally revisable, even if one's own logic gives rise to paradoxes and allows one to derive any conclusion whatsoever. Instead of revising logic, we need to revise a certain widely held position in the philosophy of logic, one tied to the standard conception of validity and to the alleged monotonicity of deductive reasoning. I devel…
Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality
Do human beings have a special and distinguished place in reality? In this book Thomas Hofweber defends that they do. We are special, since there is an intimate connection between our human minds and reality itself. Hofweber thus defends a form of idealism, in particular one which holds that our human minds constrain, but do not construct, reality as the totality of facts. Reality as the totality of facts is thus not independent of our minds, and…
Inescapable Concepts
It seems to be impossible to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world merely from our concepts or our language alone. After all, our concepts alone only concern how we aim to represent the world, not how the world in fact is. In this paper I argue that this is mistaken. We can sometimes draw substantial metaphysical conclusions simply from thinking about how we represent the world. But by themselves such conclusions can be flawed if the conc…
Alien Structure
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (11 works) · Metaphysics (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Citation (6 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Chapel (4 works)