Inescapable Concepts

Bibliographic Data

ID21293475
AuthorsThomas Hofweber (0000-0001-7095-6559, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume102
Issue1
Pages159-179
Publication date2024-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2023.2172593
OpenAlexW4323268403
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited17

It seems to be impossible to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world merely from our concepts or our language alone. After all, our concepts alone only concern how we aim to represent the world, not how the world in fact is. In this paper I argue that this is mistaken. We can sometimes draw substantial metaphysical conclusions simply from thinking about how we represent the world. But by themselves such conclusions can be flawed if the concepts from which they are drawn are themselves flawed. I propose that we can overcome these limitations by focusing on a special class of concepts: inescapable concepts. Combining arguments about what the world is like from considerations about our concepts alone, together with an argument that the relevant concepts are inescapable, leads to a novel method for metaphysics, which is broadly neo-Kantian

Argument (complex analysis) · Class (philosophy) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access