J Fdez‐Valdivia
Biographic Data
| ID | 10202995 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J Fdez‐Valdivia |
| GIVEN NAMES | J |
| FAMILY NAME | Fdez‐Valdivia |
| SIGNATURE | VALDIVIA J F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad de Granada |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7181-1554 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A systematic approach to assessing the accuracy of a peer review process in an academic journal
Do competitive forces tend to correct choice errors in journal selection due to imperfect attention on the part of researchers
For scientists, one of the most important points to consider is the right journals for research, current awareness, and publication of results. However, if scientists suffer from imperfect attention, they would pay attention to only a subset of journals in the subject category. Under this scenario, chief editors might affect preferences by using the journal’s salience to influence what scientists pay attention to. In this paper, we are going to a…
Can a paid model for peer review be sustainable when the author can decide whether to pay or not
Given how hard it is to recruit good reviewers who are aligned with authors in their functions, journal editors could consider the use of better incentives, such as paying reviewers for their time. In order to facilitate a speedy turn-around when a rapid decision is required, the peer-reviewed journal can also offer a review model in which selected peer reviewers are compensated to deliver high-quality and timely peer-review reports. In this pape…
The interplay between the reviewer’s incentives and the journal’s quality standard
Quality censoring in peer review
The editor-manuscript game
Confirmatory bias in peer review
The author–reviewer game
No prominent works on this page.
Confirmatory bias in peer review
The author–reviewer game
The interplay between the reviewer’s incentives and the journal’s quality standard
Quality censoring in peer review
The editor-manuscript game
Can a paid model for peer review be sustainable when the author can decide whether to pay or not
Given how hard it is to recruit good reviewers who are aligned with authors in their functions, journal editors could consider the use of better incentives, such as paying reviewers for their time. In order to facilitate a speedy turn-around when a rapid decision is required, the peer-reviewed journal can also offer a review model in which selected peer reviewers are compensated to deliver high-quality and timely peer-review reports. In this pape…
A systematic approach to assessing the accuracy of a peer review process in an academic journal
Do competitive forces tend to correct choice errors in journal selection due to imperfect attention on the part of researchers
For scientists, one of the most important points to consider is the right journals for research, current awareness, and publication of results. However, if scientists suffer from imperfect attention, they would pay attention to only a subset of journals in the subject category. Under this scenario, chief editors might affect preferences by using the journal’s salience to influence what scientists pay attention to. In this paper, we are going to a…
Computer Science (7 works) · Quality (philosophy) (7 works) · scientometrics and bibliometrics research (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Incentive (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Expert finding and Q&A systems (3 works) · Imperfect (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works)