Roseanne W Mcmanus
Biographic Data
| ID | 1023449 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roseanne W Mcmanus |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roseanne W |
| FAMILY NAME | Mcmanus |
| SIGNATURE | MCMANUS R W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Pennsylvania State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6526-3328 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 315 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
The Domestic Sources of International Trust
How do states overcome mistrust? Scholars argue that costly foreign policy signals build trust. But when trust is low, such as during rivalries, states are unwilling to use these signals for fear of being cheated. We argue that domestic policies can also build trust by revealing information about a state’s likelihood of cooperating internationally when there is a correlation between domestic and international preferences. We further argue that do…
Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve
When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go 'all-in' and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence…
Denying the Obvious: Why Do Nominally Covert Actions Avoid Escalation
In 2014, Russia denied that its military was assisting separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence. Why do countries bother to deny hostile actions like this even when they are obvious? Scholars have argued that making hostile actions covert can reduce pressure on the target state to escalate. Yet it is not clear whether this claim applies when evidence of responsibility for the action is publicly available. We use three survey …
The Domestic Sources of International Reputation
Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders' domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader's international reputatio…
The MID5 Dataset, 2011–2014: Procedures, coding rules, and description
This article introduces the latest iteration of the most widely used dataset on interstate conflicts, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 5 dataset. We begin by outlining the data collection process used in the MID5 project. Next, we discuss some of the most challenging cases that we coded and some updates to the coding manual that resulted. Finally, we provide descriptive statistics for the new years of the MID data
Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion
According to the ‘Madman Theory’ promoted by Richard Nixon and early rationalist scholars, being viewed as mentally unstable can help a leader coerce foreign adversaries. This article offers the first large-N test of this theory. The author introduces an original perception-based measure of leaders' reputations for madness, coded based on news reports, and analyzes its effect on both general deterrence and crisis bargaining. The study also tests …
Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders With Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion? - Corrigendum
The Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset: Putting Things in Perspective
In their latest research note in our ongoing dialogue about the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, Gibler, Miller, and Little (GML) reiterate their concerns about a high error rate in the MID dataset and challenge our prior replication studies, which showed that GML's recommended changes to the dataset caused few substantive changes in the core findings of two published studies. In this rejoinder, we offer further explanation of our de…
Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets
This article summarizes the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) Version 3.0 datasets. The new datasets include information about the population of IGOs in the international system and state participation in those formal international institutions from 1816 to 2014. Consistent with Versions 2.0 and 2.3, Version 3.0 of the IGO data comes in three forms: country-year, IGO-year, and joint dyadic membership. This article briefly de…
Updating the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data: A Response to Gibler, Miller, and Little
In a recent article, Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) (GML) conduct an extensive review of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data between the years 1816 and 2001, highlighting possible inaccuracies and recommending a substantial number of changes to the data. They contend that, in several instances, analyses with their revised data lead to substantively different inferences. Here, we review GML's MID drop and merge recommendations and ree…
Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining
This article reconsiders the theoretical logic behind the “Madman Theory”—the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I theorize about how we can best define perceived madness in a way that is relevant for analyzing coercive bargaining. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculation…
Identifying the level of major power support signaled for protégés: A latent measure approach
Major powers signal support for protégés in order to reassure them and deter harm against them. Yet, it is not always clear how to identify who a major power's protégés are or the degree of support signaled. Major powers have a variety of complementary signals to choose among, including alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and others. It can be difficult to weigh the importance of individual signals, especially since different maj…
Response to Joshua D. Kertzer’s review of Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence
This article explores how a major power's leader can deter challenges against weaker states using "leader-specific" signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs…
Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
Statements of resolve - in which leaders indicate that their country is committed to a position and will not back down - are a fixture of international conflict. However, scholars have not agreed on how much these statements affect conflict outcomes or which conditions give them coercive credibility. Statements of Resolve argues that an important and underappreciated factor influencing the impact of resolved statements is the ability to follow th…
Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining
Both threats and assurances can be useful in international negotiations. Threats help convince the adversary that a state will fight if challenged, and assurances can convince the adversary that a state will not attack if not challenged. We develop a model that analyzes when threats and assurances are used. Threats are widely useful because there is typically a range of outcomes that are preferable to war for each side, and threats can secure a b…
The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations
This paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possibl…
The Impact of Context on the Ability of Leaders to Signal Resolve
This article explores the impact of context on the ability of leaders to signal resolve in international disputes. Leaders make statements of resolve in various contexts, and the context in which a leader speaks affects the size and composition of the audience as well as how adversaries are likely to interpret the statements. I focus on comparing five main contexts in which leaders commonly make resolved statements: speeches to the nation, both s…
Fighting words: The effectiveness of statements of resolve in international conflict
This article examines the effectiveness of public statements of resolve in international conflict. Several prominent theories, including domestic audience cost theory and theories regarding international reputation, suggest that issuing resolved statements can help a leader achieve a more favorable outcome in conflict bargaining. Because they entail costs for backing down, these statements are believed to credibly convey resolve to an adversary. …
The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations
This paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possibl…
Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence
This article explores how a major power's leader can deter challenges against weaker states using "leader-specific" signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs…
The MID5 Dataset, 2011–2014: Procedures, coding rules, and description
This article introduces the latest iteration of the most widely used dataset on interstate conflicts, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 5 dataset. We begin by outlining the data collection process used in the MID5 project. Next, we discuss some of the most challenging cases that we coded and some updates to the coding manual that resulted. Finally, we provide descriptive statistics for the new years of the MID data
Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets
This article summarizes the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) Version 3.0 datasets. The new datasets include information about the population of IGOs in the international system and state participation in those formal international institutions from 1816 to 2014. Consistent with Versions 2.0 and 2.3, Version 3.0 of the IGO data comes in three forms: country-year, IGO-year, and joint dyadic membership. This article briefly de…
Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining
Both threats and assurances can be useful in international negotiations. Threats help convince the adversary that a state will fight if challenged, and assurances can convince the adversary that a state will not attack if not challenged. We develop a model that analyzes when threats and assurances are used. Threats are widely useful because there is typically a range of outcomes that are preferable to war for each side, and threats can secure a b…
Updating the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data: A Response to Gibler, Miller, and Little
In a recent article, Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) (GML) conduct an extensive review of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data between the years 1816 and 2001, highlighting possible inaccuracies and recommending a substantial number of changes to the data. They contend that, in several instances, analyses with their revised data lead to substantively different inferences. Here, we review GML's MID drop and merge recommendations and ree…
Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion
According to the ‘Madman Theory’ promoted by Richard Nixon and early rationalist scholars, being viewed as mentally unstable can help a leader coerce foreign adversaries. This article offers the first large-N test of this theory. The author introduces an original perception-based measure of leaders' reputations for madness, coded based on news reports, and analyzes its effect on both general deterrence and crisis bargaining. The study also tests …
Identifying the level of major power support signaled for protégés: A latent measure approach
Major powers signal support for protégés in order to reassure them and deter harm against them. Yet, it is not always clear how to identify who a major power's protégés are or the degree of support signaled. Major powers have a variety of complementary signals to choose among, including alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and others. It can be difficult to weigh the importance of individual signals, especially since different maj…
Fighting words: The effectiveness of statements of resolve in international conflict
This article examines the effectiveness of public statements of resolve in international conflict. Several prominent theories, including domestic audience cost theory and theories regarding international reputation, suggest that issuing resolved statements can help a leader achieve a more favorable outcome in conflict bargaining. Because they entail costs for backing down, these statements are believed to credibly convey resolve to an adversary. …
The Domestic Sources of International Reputation
Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders' domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader's international reputatio…
Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining
This article reconsiders the theoretical logic behind the “Madman Theory”—the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I theorize about how we can best define perceived madness in a way that is relevant for analyzing coercive bargaining. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculation…
The Impact of Context on the Ability of Leaders to Signal Resolve
This article explores the impact of context on the ability of leaders to signal resolve in international disputes. Leaders make statements of resolve in various contexts, and the context in which a leader speaks affects the size and composition of the audience as well as how adversaries are likely to interpret the statements. I focus on comparing five main contexts in which leaders commonly make resolved statements: speeches to the nation, both s…
Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve
When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go 'all-in' and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence…
The Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset: Putting Things in Perspective
In their latest research note in our ongoing dialogue about the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, Gibler, Miller, and Little (GML) reiterate their concerns about a high error rate in the MID dataset and challenge our prior replication studies, which showed that GML's recommended changes to the dataset caused few substantive changes in the core findings of two published studies. In this rejoinder, we offer further explanation of our de…
Fighting words: The effectiveness of statements of resolve in international conflict
This article examines the effectiveness of public statements of resolve in international conflict. Several prominent theories, including domestic audience cost theory and theories regarding international reputation, suggest that issuing resolved statements can help a leader achieve a more favorable outcome in conflict bargaining. Because they entail costs for backing down, these statements are believed to credibly convey resolve to an adversary. …
The Impact of Context on the Ability of Leaders to Signal Resolve
This article explores the impact of context on the ability of leaders to signal resolve in international disputes. Leaders make statements of resolve in various contexts, and the context in which a leader speaks affects the size and composition of the audience as well as how adversaries are likely to interpret the statements. I focus on comparing five main contexts in which leaders commonly make resolved statements: speeches to the nation, both s…
Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
Statements of resolve - in which leaders indicate that their country is committed to a position and will not back down - are a fixture of international conflict. However, scholars have not agreed on how much these statements affect conflict outcomes or which conditions give them coercive credibility. Statements of Resolve argues that an important and underappreciated factor influencing the impact of resolved statements is the ability to follow th…
Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining
Both threats and assurances can be useful in international negotiations. Threats help convince the adversary that a state will fight if challenged, and assurances can convince the adversary that a state will not attack if not challenged. We develop a model that analyzes when threats and assurances are used. Threats are widely useful because there is typically a range of outcomes that are preferable to war for each side, and threats can secure a b…
The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations
This paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possibl…
Response to Joshua D. Kertzer’s review of Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence
This article explores how a major power's leader can deter challenges against weaker states using "leader-specific" signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs…
Updating the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data: A Response to Gibler, Miller, and Little
In a recent article, Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) (GML) conduct an extensive review of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data between the years 1816 and 2001, highlighting possible inaccuracies and recommending a substantial number of changes to the data. They contend that, in several instances, analyses with their revised data lead to substantively different inferences. Here, we review GML's MID drop and merge recommendations and ree…
Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining
This article reconsiders the theoretical logic behind the “Madman Theory”—the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I theorize about how we can best define perceived madness in a way that is relevant for analyzing coercive bargaining. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculation…
Identifying the level of major power support signaled for protégés: A latent measure approach
Major powers signal support for protégés in order to reassure them and deter harm against them. Yet, it is not always clear how to identify who a major power's protégés are or the degree of support signaled. Major powers have a variety of complementary signals to choose among, including alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and others. It can be difficult to weigh the importance of individual signals, especially since different maj…
The Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset: Putting Things in Perspective
In their latest research note in our ongoing dialogue about the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, Gibler, Miller, and Little (GML) reiterate their concerns about a high error rate in the MID dataset and challenge our prior replication studies, which showed that GML's recommended changes to the dataset caused few substantive changes in the core findings of two published studies. In this rejoinder, we offer further explanation of our de…
Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets
This article summarizes the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) Version 3.0 datasets. The new datasets include information about the population of IGOs in the international system and state participation in those formal international institutions from 1816 to 2014. Consistent with Versions 2.0 and 2.3, Version 3.0 of the IGO data comes in three forms: country-year, IGO-year, and joint dyadic membership. This article briefly de…
The MID5 Dataset, 2011–2014: Procedures, coding rules, and description
This article introduces the latest iteration of the most widely used dataset on interstate conflicts, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 5 dataset. We begin by outlining the data collection process used in the MID5 project. Next, we discuss some of the most challenging cases that we coded and some updates to the coding manual that resulted. Finally, we provide descriptive statistics for the new years of the MID data
Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion
According to the ‘Madman Theory’ promoted by Richard Nixon and early rationalist scholars, being viewed as mentally unstable can help a leader coerce foreign adversaries. This article offers the first large-N test of this theory. The author introduces an original perception-based measure of leaders' reputations for madness, coded based on news reports, and analyzes its effect on both general deterrence and crisis bargaining. The study also tests …
Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders With Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion? - Corrigendum
The Domestic Sources of International Reputation
Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders' domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader's international reputatio…
Denying the Obvious: Why Do Nominally Covert Actions Avoid Escalation
In 2014, Russia denied that its military was assisting separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence. Why do countries bother to deny hostile actions like this even when they are obvious? Scholars have argued that making hostile actions covert can reduce pressure on the target state to escalate. Yet it is not clear whether this claim applies when evidence of responsibility for the action is publicly available. We use three survey …
Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve
When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go 'all-in' and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence…
The Domestic Sources of International Trust
How do states overcome mistrust? Scholars argue that costly foreign policy signals build trust. But when trust is low, such as during rivalries, states are unwilling to use these signals for fear of being cheated. We argue that domestic policies can also build trust by revealing information about a state’s likelihood of cooperating internationally when there is a correlation between domestic and international preferences. We further argue that do…
Political science (14 works) · Economics (11 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (11 works) · Law (11 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Law (9 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Positive economics (7 works) · Social Psychology (7 works)