Identifying the level of major power support signaled for protégés
A latent measure approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4772098 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Roseanne W Mcmanus (0000-0001-6526-3328, Pennsylvania State University), Mark David Nieman (0000-0002-9286-6367, Iowa State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 364-378 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318808842 |
| OpenAlex | W2915642065 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 42 |
| References cited | 39 |
Major powers signal support for protégés in order to reassure them and deter harm against them. Yet, it is not always clear how to identify who a major power's protégés are or the degree of support signaled. Major powers have a variety of complementary signals to choose among, including alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and others. It can be difficult to weigh the importance of individual signals, especially since different major powers do not deploy each signal in the same way. We address this challenge using a Bayesian latent measurement model, which provides a theoretically coherent means of identifying the overall level of support signaled by a major power for a protégé. Our approach yields a cross-sectional time-series dataset, providing a continuous measure of the degree of support signaled by major powers for all minor powers from 1950 to 2012. Our model also provides insights regarding which signals of support are most informative when sent by each major power. We find considerable variation among major powers regarding which of their signals are most meaningful, but in general alliances and military exercises tend to be among the most important signals. In further applications using our latent measure, we also assess under which conditions major powers are likely to increase their signals of support for protégés, as well as predict whether a major power will intervene in conflicts involving its protégés
Computer security · Data mining · Harm · Measure (data warehouse) · Operations research · Power (physics) · Statistical power · Statistics · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Engineering · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Revisiting Our Understanding of Major Power Diplomacy
The limits of financial statecraft
Major powers’ management of complex peace relationships
Uncomfortable neighbors
The power of disrespect
Fragile alliances and costly signals
From former foes to friends
Strategic partnerships in alliance politics
Measuring state security relationships
US global military deployments, 1950–2020
Introducing the new diplomatic visits with France dataset, 1950–2020
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Political leaders and military spending
Presidential hawkishness, domestic popularity, and diplomatic normalization
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Foreign policy alignment in asymmetric alliances
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Arms and Aggression in the Middle East
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| Unique citing works | 42 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 42 |