Cheryl Misak
Biographic Data
| ID | 1023855 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Cheryl Misak |
| GIVEN NAMES | Cheryl |
| FAMILY NAME | Misak |
| SIGNATURE | MISAK C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 30 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 29 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Truth and ethics in a pragmatist functional metaphysics
This paper draw outs and expands on three themes in Aime Thomasson’s Rethinking Metaphysics. First, I trace the roots of her central idea (that we only understand our concepts when we understand the roles they play in our lives) in classical pragmatism. I then offer some suggestions and ask some questions, emanating from the classical pragmatists C.S. Peirce, C.I. Lewis, and F.P. Ramsey, about Thomasson’s thoughts about truth and her thoughts abo…
Ramsey’s limited interest in his definition of truth
F.P. Ramsey is thought to offer a definition of truth. We shall see that he often says he is doing just that. His entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states: The definition of truth Ra
Pragmatism, Truth, and Politics
This paper defends a Peircean account truth in politics and ethics. It also sets out a novel epistemic conception of democracy. Roughly, if we are to aim at truth, we must take into account all the relevant experience and sustain the conditions under which prevailing arrangements may be contested, an idea which is aligned with democratic politics. Along the way, it identifies a mistake inspired by Dewey and one by Peirce and shows how these mista…
A new history and underpinning for conceptual engineering
The later Carnap is usually cited as the first conceptual engineer – someone who argues that we can and should revise our concepts in order to make them fit for their purpose. This paper shows that there is an earlier, pragmatist, account of conceptual engineering and that today’s conceptual engineers would do well to turn to it, rather than to Carnap
Ian Hacking (1936-2023)
Ian Hacking died in Toronto on May 10, 2023. Sadly, his health had been declining since his wife, the philosopher Judith Baker, died in 2014. He never recovered from that blow.Ian left us a large body of beautifully written and highly influential work across an astonishing range of disciplines—probability theory and statistical inference, experimental physics, and the philosophy of mathematics, language, logic, classification, mental health, race…
Richardson on the construction of moral norms
Henry Richardson's Articulating the Moral Community provides us with a rich pragmatist account of how we might settle a set of tensions at the heart of our conception of morality. On the one hand, we feel moral norms are objectively binding—it's not merely an individual's values or a culture's conventions that makes it wrong, for instance, to torture an animal. On the other hand, it's clear that we human beings, with our contingent histories, cap…
A Sensible Pragmatist Conception of Truth
This essay traces the evolution of the pragmatist elements in Wiggins's distinctive view of truth and shows its connections to the founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce and one of Peirce's greatest successors, F.P. Ramsey. Wiggin's pragmatism, like that of Peirce and Ramsey, is a pragmatism that attempts to arrive at what Wiggins calls ‘a sensible subjectivism’ – an account of truth that respects both the human inventiveness and the objectivity that…
Pragmatism, truth, and democracy
Pragmatism, Truth, and Democracy
Il y a un intérêt croissant pour la démocratie délibérative, en particulier pour sa version pragmatiste qui soutient que les libertés et les procédures démocratiques sont plus susceptibles de nous amener à la bonne conception de ce qui est vrai, équitable ou juste. Aujourd’hui, se concentrer sur la vérité est plus important que jamais. Nous (Robert Talisse et Cheryl Misak) avons proposé une argumentation selon laquelle les libertés et les procédu…
Williams, Pragmatism, and the Law
Ramsey, Pragmatism, and the Vienna Circle
Frank Ramsey (1903-1930) is usually taken to be sympathetic to the Vienna Circle’s project. I will argue that this is not right. Ramsey was a pragmatist, and he put pragmatist objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, objections which also had the Vienna Circle as their target. Ramsey thought the Circle’s position (like Wittgenstein’s) was mistaken in that, instead of starting with human inquiry, it tried to construct the world out of elementary pa…
There Can Be No Difference Anywhere that Doesn't Make a Difference Elsewhere”
In my response to the five rich papers on Cambridge Pragmatism published in the current issue of the Transactions, I happily acknowledge Clifford as perhaps the first Cambridge (England) pragmatist; improve on my account of truth as adhering to habits as well as propositions; clarify my position on pragmatism and the free will debate; and speak to the need, and grounds upon which, to differentiate pragmatism from other traditions
Cambridge Pragmatism
Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the reception of American pragmatism in England. Supposedly it never recovered from the attacks of Russell and Moore; but Misak shows that Frank Ramsey, under the influence of Peirce, developed a pragmatist position of great promise, and that he transmitted that pragmatism to his friend Wittgensteinches
Bridges across the Atlantic
In this chapter we learn how James’s position was amplified or made more extreme by F. C. S. Schiller in Oxford, who sometimes said that truth was ‘wholly plastic’. Since James kept his reservations about Schiller’s way of expressing pragmatism private and publicly identified his version of pragmatism with Schiller’s position, it was taken in England to be the official position of the pragmatists. The fascinating story is told of how Ramsey was i…
Pragmatism and the Naturalist Project in Ethics and Politics
It is argued here that the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce, C.I. Lewis and Frank Ramsey can deliver a cognitivist, naturalist account of ethical and political inquiry. The ensuing position escapes relativism and delivers a conception of ethical and political beliefs on which they are evaluable
Language and Experience for Pragmatism
It is sometimes said that contemporary pragmatists place too much emphasis on language and not enough on experience. This objection might hold for the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and his students, but it does not hold for the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I shall argue that we should return to the classical pragmatists and their truth-and-experience position. Indeed, an important insight at the very heart of pragmatis…
Debate
Rorty, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy
One of Richard Rorty's legacies is to have put a Jamesian version of pragmatism on the contemporary philosophical map. Part of his argument has been that pragmatism and analytic philosophy are set against each other, with pragmatism almost having been killed off by the reigning analytic philosophy. The argument of this paper is that there is a better and more interesting reading of both the history of pragmatism and the history of analytic philos…
Reply to Margolis, Madelrieux and Levine
Allow me to begin by thanking these three commentators for the time and energy they have put into thinking about the issues I raise in The American Pragmatists. There are some important common themes in their reading of the book and I am grateful for the opportunity to address them, and to clarify and expand on what I wrote. One thing that common to all three readers is that they see me as offering, in Stéphane Madelrieux’s words, a history of pr…
Making Disagreement Matter
The Oxford handbook of American philosophy
In this collective study of the development of philosophy in America from the 18th century to the present, leading experts examine distinctive features of American philosophy, trace notable themes, and consider the legacy of key figures, such as Emerson, James and Dewey.
Truth, Politics, Morality
Cheryl Misak argues that truth ought to be reinstated to a central position in moral and political philosophy. She argues that the correct account of truth is one found in a certain kind of pragmatism: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve, a belief which would not be defeated by experience and argument. This account is not only an improvement on the views of central figures such as Rawls and Habermas, but it can also make sen…
Truth, Politics, Morality
Truth, politics, morality
Engaging Reason
Debate
Pragmatism, Truth, and Democracy
Il y a un intérêt croissant pour la démocratie délibérative, en particulier pour sa version pragmatiste qui soutient que les libertés et les procédures démocratiques sont plus susceptibles de nous amener à la bonne conception de ce qui est vrai, équitable ou juste. Aujourd’hui, se concentrer sur la vérité est plus important que jamais. Nous (Robert Talisse et Cheryl Misak) avons proposé une argumentation selon laquelle les libertés et les procédu…
Pragmatism and the Naturalist Project in Ethics and Politics
It is argued here that the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce, C.I. Lewis and Frank Ramsey can deliver a cognitivist, naturalist account of ethical and political inquiry. The ensuing position escapes relativism and delivers a conception of ethical and political beliefs on which they are evaluable
Peirce, Levi, and the Aims of Inquiry
Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own “epistemological infallibilism“. I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry
Language and Experience for Pragmatism
It is sometimes said that contemporary pragmatists place too much emphasis on language and not enough on experience. This objection might hold for the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and his students, but it does not hold for the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I shall argue that we should return to the classical pragmatists and their truth-and-experience position. Indeed, an important insight at the very heart of pragmatis…
The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy
What justifies democracy? This question is considered critically, examining answers others have given to it. The author also develops his own theory of democracy, arguing that it resembles a moral conversation and is valued because of its capacity to generate an impartial perspective
Peirce, Levi, and the Aims of Inquiry
Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own “epistemological infallibilism“. I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry
Truth and the End of Inquiry
Introduction 1. Pragmatism 2. Inquiry: The Fixation of Belief 3. Logic 4. Objectivity, Bivalence, and Truth 5. Ethics Bibliography Index
William James
Truth and Historicity
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Truth and Historicity. By Richard Campbell. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. xi + 463. Price not given.) Cheryl Misak Cheryl Misak University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 182, January 1996, Pages 122–124, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956316 Published: 01 January 1996
The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy
What justifies democracy? This question is considered critically, examining answers others have given to it. The author also develops his own theory of democracy, arguing that it resembles a moral conversation and is valued because of its capacity to generate an impartial perspective
Engaging Reason
Truth, Politics, Morality
Cheryl Misak argues that truth ought to be reinstated to a central position in moral and political philosophy. She argues that the correct account of truth is one found in a certain kind of pragmatism: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve, a belief which would not be defeated by experience and argument. This account is not only an improvement on the views of central figures such as Rawls and Habermas, but it can also make sen…
Truth, Politics, Morality
Truth, politics, morality
The Oxford handbook of American philosophy
In this collective study of the development of philosophy in America from the 18th century to the present, leading experts examine distinctive features of American philosophy, trace notable themes, and consider the legacy of key figures, such as Emerson, James and Dewey.
Making Disagreement Matter
Rorty, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy
One of Richard Rorty's legacies is to have put a Jamesian version of pragmatism on the contemporary philosophical map. Part of his argument has been that pragmatism and analytic philosophy are set against each other, with pragmatism almost having been killed off by the reigning analytic philosophy. The argument of this paper is that there is a better and more interesting reading of both the history of pragmatism and the history of analytic philos…
Reply to Margolis, Madelrieux and Levine
Allow me to begin by thanking these three commentators for the time and energy they have put into thinking about the issues I raise in The American Pragmatists. There are some important common themes in their reading of the book and I am grateful for the opportunity to address them, and to clarify and expand on what I wrote. One thing that common to all three readers is that they see me as offering, in Stéphane Madelrieux’s words, a history of pr…
Language and Experience for Pragmatism
It is sometimes said that contemporary pragmatists place too much emphasis on language and not enough on experience. This objection might hold for the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and his students, but it does not hold for the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I shall argue that we should return to the classical pragmatists and their truth-and-experience position. Indeed, an important insight at the very heart of pragmatis…
Debate
Cambridge Pragmatism
Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the reception of American pragmatism in England. Supposedly it never recovered from the attacks of Russell and Moore; but Misak shows that Frank Ramsey, under the influence of Peirce, developed a pragmatist position of great promise, and that he transmitted that pragmatism to his friend Wittgensteinches
Bridges across the Atlantic
In this chapter we learn how James’s position was amplified or made more extreme by F. C. S. Schiller in Oxford, who sometimes said that truth was ‘wholly plastic’. Since James kept his reservations about Schiller’s way of expressing pragmatism private and publicly identified his version of pragmatism with Schiller’s position, it was taken in England to be the official position of the pragmatists. The fascinating story is told of how Ramsey was i…
Pragmatism and the Naturalist Project in Ethics and Politics
It is argued here that the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce, C.I. Lewis and Frank Ramsey can deliver a cognitivist, naturalist account of ethical and political inquiry. The ensuing position escapes relativism and delivers a conception of ethical and political beliefs on which they are evaluable
There Can Be No Difference Anywhere that Doesn't Make a Difference Elsewhere”
In my response to the five rich papers on Cambridge Pragmatism published in the current issue of the Transactions, I happily acknowledge Clifford as perhaps the first Cambridge (England) pragmatist; improve on my account of truth as adhering to habits as well as propositions; clarify my position on pragmatism and the free will debate; and speak to the need, and grounds upon which, to differentiate pragmatism from other traditions
Ramsey, Pragmatism, and the Vienna Circle
Frank Ramsey (1903-1930) is usually taken to be sympathetic to the Vienna Circle’s project. I will argue that this is not right. Ramsey was a pragmatist, and he put pragmatist objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, objections which also had the Vienna Circle as their target. Ramsey thought the Circle’s position (like Wittgenstein’s) was mistaken in that, instead of starting with human inquiry, it tried to construct the world out of elementary pa…
Williams, Pragmatism, and the Law
Pragmatism, truth, and democracy
Pragmatism, Truth, and Democracy
Il y a un intérêt croissant pour la démocratie délibérative, en particulier pour sa version pragmatiste qui soutient que les libertés et les procédures démocratiques sont plus susceptibles de nous amener à la bonne conception de ce qui est vrai, équitable ou juste. Aujourd’hui, se concentrer sur la vérité est plus important que jamais. Nous (Robert Talisse et Cheryl Misak) avons proposé une argumentation selon laquelle les libertés et les procédu…
A Sensible Pragmatist Conception of Truth
This essay traces the evolution of the pragmatist elements in Wiggins's distinctive view of truth and shows its connections to the founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce and one of Peirce's greatest successors, F.P. Ramsey. Wiggin's pragmatism, like that of Peirce and Ramsey, is a pragmatism that attempts to arrive at what Wiggins calls ‘a sensible subjectivism’ – an account of truth that respects both the human inventiveness and the objectivity that…
Richardson on the construction of moral norms
Henry Richardson's Articulating the Moral Community provides us with a rich pragmatist account of how we might settle a set of tensions at the heart of our conception of morality. On the one hand, we feel moral norms are objectively binding—it's not merely an individual's values or a culture's conventions that makes it wrong, for instance, to torture an animal. On the other hand, it's clear that we human beings, with our contingent histories, cap…
Philosophy (18 works) · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education (18 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Pragmatism (14 works) · Political science (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Politics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Sociology (6 works)