Peirce, Levi, and the Aims of Inquiry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705993 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cheryl Misak (University of Oxford, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 256-265 |
| Publication date | 1987-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289374 |
| OpenAlex | W2010532347 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 1 |
Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own “epistemological infallibilism“. I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry
Certainty · Epistemology · Pragmatism · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Religion, Ecology, and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |