J Dmitri Gallow
Biographic Data
| ID | 1024243 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J Dmitri Gallow |
| GIVEN NAMES | J Dmitri |
| FAMILY NAME | Gallow |
| SIGNATURE | GALLOW J D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pittsburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6513-2050 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Comparativism About Instrumental Value
Causal and evidential decision theory each give us a relationship between instrumental rationality and final value. It is less clear what relationship they posit between instrumental rationality and instrumental value. Some have argued that evidential decision theory implies a form of nihilism about instrumental value. This form of nihilism says that there's no fact‐of‐the‐matter about what a choice did to help you achieve your ends. In contrast,…
It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best
In this journal, Jack Spencer argues that we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it is incompatible with this principle: if you know that you will choose x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x. I agree with Spencer that defenders of MaxRat should reject this principle. However, I disagree insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are in a p…
Instrumental divergence
Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory
The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathe…
Decision and foreknowledge
My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supp…
Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference
Standard principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles those problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle
The Sure Thing Principle leads to instability
Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I’ll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage’s Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it
Local and global deference
A norm of local expert deference says that your credence in an arbitrary proposition A , given that the expert’s probability for A is n , should be n . A norm of global expert deference says that your credence in A , given that the expert’s entire probability function is E , should be E ( A ). Gaifman taught us that these two norms are not equivalent. Stalnaker conjectures that Gaifman’s example is “a loophole”. Here, I substantiate Stalnaker’s s…
Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances
An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. As long as you recognise possibilities…
How to Trace a Causal Process
According to the theory developed here, we may trace out the processes emanating from a cause in such a way that any consequence lying along one of these processes counts as an effect of the cause. This theory gives intuitive verdicts in a diverse range of problem cases from the literature. Its claims about causation will never be retracted when we include additional variables in our model. And it validates some plausible principles about causati…
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals…
Riches and Rationality
A one-boxer, Erica, and a two-boxer, Chloe, engage in a familiar debate. The debate begins with Erica asking Chloe, ‘If you’re so smart, then why ain’cha rich?’ As the debate progresses, Chloe is led to endorse a novel causalist theory of rational choice. This new theory allows her to forge a connection between rational choice and long-run riches. In brief, Chloe concludes that it is not long-run wealth but rather long-run wealth creation that is…
A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance
A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation
This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn’t cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that that C caused (didn’t cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M. The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause …
The Causal Decision Theorist's Guide to Managing the News
According to orthodox causal decision theory, performing an action can give you information about factors outside of your control, but you should not take this information into account when deciding what to do. Causal decision theorists caution against an irrational policy of "managing the news." But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, performing an act can give you two, importantly different, kinds of news. It can te…
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
A handful of well‐known arguments (the ‘diachronic Dutch book arguments’) rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not ‘diachronically Dutch book‐able’) if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non‐trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire—in the c…
How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism
Weisberg ([2009]) provides an argument that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization is capable of accommodating the holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience can suffer undercutting defeat. I diagnose this failure as stemming from the fact that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization give any advice about how to rationally respond to theory-dependent evidence, and I propose a novel updating …
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
A handful of well‐known arguments (the ‘diachronic Dutch book arguments’) rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not ‘diachronically Dutch book‐able’) if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non‐trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire—in the c…
How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism
Weisberg ([2009]) provides an argument that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization is capable of accommodating the holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience can suffer undercutting defeat. I diagnose this failure as stemming from the fact that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization give any advice about how to rationally respond to theory-dependent evidence, and I propose a novel updating …
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals…
Instrumental divergence
A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance
A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation
This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn’t cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that that C caused (didn’t cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M. The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause …
How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism
Weisberg ([2009]) provides an argument that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization is capable of accommodating the holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience can suffer undercutting defeat. I diagnose this failure as stemming from the fact that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization give any advice about how to rationally respond to theory-dependent evidence, and I propose a novel updating …
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
A handful of well‐known arguments (the ‘diachronic Dutch book arguments’) rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not ‘diachronically Dutch book‐able’) if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non‐trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire—in the c…
The Causal Decision Theorist's Guide to Managing the News
According to orthodox causal decision theory, performing an action can give you information about factors outside of your control, but you should not take this information into account when deciding what to do. Causal decision theorists caution against an irrational policy of "managing the news." But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, performing an act can give you two, importantly different, kinds of news. It can te…
Riches and Rationality
A one-boxer, Erica, and a two-boxer, Chloe, engage in a familiar debate. The debate begins with Erica asking Chloe, ‘If you’re so smart, then why ain’cha rich?’ As the debate progresses, Chloe is led to endorse a novel causalist theory of rational choice. This new theory allows her to forge a connection between rational choice and long-run riches. In brief, Chloe concludes that it is not long-run wealth but rather long-run wealth creation that is…
A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance
A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation
This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn’t cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that that C caused (didn’t cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M. The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause …
Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances
An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. As long as you recognise possibilities…
How to Trace a Causal Process
According to the theory developed here, we may trace out the processes emanating from a cause in such a way that any consequence lying along one of these processes counts as an effect of the cause. This theory gives intuitive verdicts in a diverse range of problem cases from the literature. Its claims about causation will never be retracted when we include additional variables in our model. And it validates some plausible principles about causati…
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking
If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals…
Local and global deference
A norm of local expert deference says that your credence in an arbitrary proposition A , given that the expert’s probability for A is n , should be n . A norm of global expert deference says that your credence in A , given that the expert’s entire probability function is E , should be E ( A ). Gaifman taught us that these two norms are not equivalent. Stalnaker conjectures that Gaifman’s example is “a loophole”. Here, I substantiate Stalnaker’s s…
Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory
The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathe…
Decision and foreknowledge
My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supp…
Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference
Standard principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles those problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle
The Sure Thing Principle leads to instability
Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I’ll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage’s Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it
It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best
In this journal, Jack Spencer argues that we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it is incompatible with this principle: if you know that you will choose x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x. I agree with Spencer that defenders of MaxRat should reject this principle. However, I disagree insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are in a p…
Instrumental divergence
Comparativism About Instrumental Value
Causal and evidential decision theory each give us a relationship between instrumental rationality and final value. It is less clear what relationship they posit between instrumental rationality and instrumental value. Some have argued that evidential decision theory implies a form of nihilism about instrumental value. This form of nihilism says that there's no fact‐of‐the‐matter about what a choice did to help you achieve your ends. In contrast,…
Epistemology (16 works) · Philosophy (16 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (13 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Law (5 works)