It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293563 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Dmitri Gallow (0000-0002-6513-2050, University of Southern California, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 540-546 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2024.2310197 |
| OpenAlex | W4403285147 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
In this journal, Jack Spencer argues that we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it is incompatible with this principle: if you know that you will choose x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x. I agree with Spencer that defenders of MaxRat should reject this principle. However, I disagree insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are in a position to accept it. Both orthodox CDT and Spencer’s own theory of rational choice are incompatible with the principle as well. It is surprising to realise, but all are agreed: it can be irrational to knowingly choose the best
Epistemology · Irrational number · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |