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James H Fetzer

Biographic Data

ID1026463
NAMEJames H Fetzer
GIVEN NAMESJames H
FAMILY NAMEFetzer
SIGNATUREFETZER J H
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Minnesota, Duluth
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS21
TOTAL CITATIONS48
AUTHOR COUNT20
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1972
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
H-INDEX5
  • Evolution and atheism: Has Griffin reconciled science and religion

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2011•References: 6

  • In Memoriam: Wesley C. Salmon (1925-2001)

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2002

  • Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best Explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2002•Cited by: 1•References: 12

  • Mental Algorithms: Are Minds Computational Systems

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•1994

    The idea that human thought requires the execution of mental algorithms provides a foundation for research programs in cognitive science, which are largely based upon the computational conception of language and mentality. Consideration is given to recent work by Penrose, Searle, and Cleland, who supply various grounds for disputing computationalism. These grounds in turn qualify as reasons for preferring a non-computational, semiotic approach, w…

  • What makes connectionism different

    James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•1994

    Preview this article: What makes connectionism different?, Page 1 of 1 /docserver/preview/fulltext/pc.2.2.09fet-1.gif

  • What's Wrong with Salmon's History: The Third Decade

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1992•Cited by: 1•References: 16

    My purpose here is to elaborate the reasons I maintain that Salmon has not been completely successful in reporting the history of work on explanation. The most important limitation of his account is that it does not emphasize the critical necessity to embrace a suitable conception of probability in the development of the theory of probabilistic explanation

  • Evolution, rationality, and testability

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • Wesley Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1987•References: 11

    If the decades of the forties through the sixties were dominated by discussion of Hempel's “covering law“ explication of explanation (and its variants), that of the seventies was preoccupied with Salmon's “statistical relevance” conception, which emerged as the principal alternative to Hempel's enormously influential account. Readers of Wesley C. Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Salmon 1984), therefore, ought…

  • Methodological individualism: Singular causal systems and their population manifestations

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1986•References: 10

  • Sociobiology and Epistemology

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•BOOK•Sociobiology and Epistemology•1985

  • Probability and objectivity in deterministic and indeterministic situations

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1983•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Probability and explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 2•References: 26

  • A probabilistic causal calculus: Conflicting conceptions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981

  • Brian Skyrms, Causal Necessity , New Haven: Yale, 1980. xii + 205 pp. n.p

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1981•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • A probabilistic causal calculus: Conflicting conceptions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1980•Cited by: 6

  • Syntax, semantics, and ontology: A probabilistic causal calculus

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1979•Cited by: 9•References: 16

  • Reichenbach, reference classes, and single case ?probabilities

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Cited by: 9

  • A world of dispositions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Cited by: 6

  • Achinstein's Law and Explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1975•References: 3

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • A single case propensity theory of explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1974•Cited by: 10

  • Philosophy of science versus psychology of science

    James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1972

  • A single case propensity theory of explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1974•Cited by: 10

  • Syntax, semantics, and ontology: A probabilistic causal calculus

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1979•Cited by: 9•References: 16

  • Reichenbach, reference classes, and single case ?probabilities

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Cited by: 9

  • A probabilistic causal calculus: Conflicting conceptions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1980•Cited by: 6

  • A world of dispositions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Cited by: 6

  • Probability and objectivity in deterministic and indeterministic situations

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1983•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Probability and explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 2•References: 26

  • Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best Explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2002•Cited by: 1•References: 12

  • What's Wrong with Salmon's History: The Third Decade

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1992•Cited by: 1•References: 16

    My purpose here is to elaborate the reasons I maintain that Salmon has not been completely successful in reporting the history of work on explanation. The most important limitation of his account is that it does not emphasize the critical necessity to embrace a suitable conception of probability in the development of the theory of probabilistic explanation

  • Evolution, rationality, and testability

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • Brian Skyrms, Causal Necessity , New Haven: Yale, 1980. xii + 205 pp. n.p

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1981•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Philosophy of science versus psychology of science

    James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1972

  • A single case propensity theory of explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1974•Cited by: 10

  • Achinstein's Law and Explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1975•References: 3

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Reichenbach, reference classes, and single case ?probabilities

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Cited by: 9

  • A world of dispositions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Cited by: 6

  • Syntax, semantics, and ontology: A probabilistic causal calculus

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1979•Cited by: 9•References: 16

  • A probabilistic causal calculus: Conflicting conceptions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1980•Cited by: 6

  • Probability and explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Cited by: 2•References: 26

  • A probabilistic causal calculus: Conflicting conceptions

    Open Access•James H Fetzer, Donald Nute et al.•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981

  • Brian Skyrms, Causal Necessity , New Haven: Yale, 1980. xii + 205 pp. n.p

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1981•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Probability and objectivity in deterministic and indeterministic situations

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1983•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Sociobiology and Epistemology

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•BOOK•Sociobiology and Epistemology•1985

  • Methodological individualism: Singular causal systems and their population manifestations

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1986•References: 10

  • Wesley Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1987•References: 11

    If the decades of the forties through the sixties were dominated by discussion of Hempel's “covering law“ explication of explanation (and its variants), that of the seventies was preoccupied with Salmon's “statistical relevance” conception, which emerged as the principal alternative to Hempel's enormously influential account. Readers of Wesley C. Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Salmon 1984), therefore, ought…

  • Evolution, rationality, and testability

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 2

  • What's Wrong with Salmon's History: The Third Decade

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1992•Cited by: 1•References: 16

    My purpose here is to elaborate the reasons I maintain that Salmon has not been completely successful in reporting the history of work on explanation. The most important limitation of his account is that it does not emphasize the critical necessity to embrace a suitable conception of probability in the development of the theory of probabilistic explanation

  • Mental Algorithms: Are Minds Computational Systems

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•1994

    The idea that human thought requires the execution of mental algorithms provides a foundation for research programs in cognitive science, which are largely based upon the computational conception of language and mentality. Consideration is given to recent work by Penrose, Searle, and Cleland, who supply various grounds for disputing computationalism. These grounds in turn qualify as reasons for preferring a non-computational, semiotic approach, w…

  • What makes connectionism different

    James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•1994

    Preview this article: What makes connectionism different?, Page 1 of 1 /docserver/preview/fulltext/pc.2.2.09fet-1.gif

  • In Memoriam: Wesley C. Salmon (1925-2001)

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2002

  • Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best Explanation

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2002•Cited by: 1•References: 12

  • Evolution and atheism: Has Griffin reconciled science and religion

    Open Access•James H Fetzer•ARTICLE•Synthese•2011•References: 6

Epistemology (19 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (14 works) · Philosophy of science (14 works) · Metaphysics (13 works) · Philosophy of language (12 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Sociology (5 works)

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