Robert Shaver
Biographic Data
| ID | 1036629 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert Shaver |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert |
| FAMILY NAME | Shaver |
| SIGNATURE | SHAVER R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manitoba |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3450-5168 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 25 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Against the Normativity of Welfare
Many think that welfare is a normative concept or property. I take it that claiming that the concept of welfare is normative is to claim that it follows analytically from G’s contributing to X’s welfare thatX has a reason to have a pro-attitude toward G. I point to advantages to thinking that welfare is not normative in this sense. I then criticise arguments for why one might think that welfare is a normative concept. Here I suggest other senses …
Nietzsche on the value of power and pleasure
Nietzsche seems to hold that ‘higher types’, or examples of great power, are the only things good as an end. I consider and reject three reconstructions of Nietzsche’s argument for this: that it follows from understanding evolution, or from the will to power understood as a descriptive thesis, or from our admiration for such types. I suggest that Nietzsche’s strategy is to take for granted our shared admiration for higher types and then attack ou…
The Decline of Egoism
Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, w…
Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons
Sidgwick's Distinction Passage
I suggest that Sidgwick, in his controversial “distinction passage,” has Schopenhauer in mind as someone who denies egoism on the ground that there are no separate individuals. I then reconstruct Sidgwick's argument in the passage. I take him to be defending a presupposition of the case for choosing egoism over utilitarianism. He is claiming that there are separate individuals. I close by rejecting alternative interpretations, on which Sidgwick i…
Prichard's Arguments against Ideal Utilitarianism
I give and evaluate Prichard's many (often obscure and idiosyncratic) arguments against ideal utilitarianism
The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics
Journal Article The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics Get access The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics.Byde Lazari-Radek Katarzyna Singer Peter. (Oxford: OUP, 2014. Pp. xvi + 403. Price £30.00.) Robert Shaver Robert Shaver University of Manitoba E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume …
Ross on Self and Others
Ross suggests a trilemma: (i) Innocent pleasure is good as an end. (ii) I have a prima facie duty to produce what is good as an end. (iii) I have no prima facie duty to produce innocent pleasure for myself. In The Right and the Good , he denies (iii). In Foundations of Ethics , he denies (i). Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. One ought instead to deny (ii). I close by considering a similar trilemma concerning justice
Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism
Sidgwick gives various tests for highest certainty. When he applies these tests to commonsense morality, he finds nothing of highest certainty. In contrast, when he applies these tests to his own axioms, he finds these axioms to have highest certainty. The axioms culminate in Benevolence: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, …
Thomson's Trolley Switch
No abstract
The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism - Alison Hills
The Appeal of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism continues to vex its critics even in the absence of generally respected arguments in its favour. I suggest that utilitarianism survives largely because of its welfarism. This explains why it survives without the backing of respected arguments. It survives without such arguments because justifying the value of welfare requires no such argument
Principia Then and Now
Moore is taken to have followed Sidgwick in his arguments against naturalism and in his consequentialism. I argue that there are differences on both issues. Sidgwick's arguments against naturalism do not rely on a controversial view of analysis, and one of his arguments for consequentialism gives him greater resources against critics of consequentialism such as T. M. Scanlon
Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History
Sidgwick's Minimal Metaethics
Non-naturalism has a shady reputation. This reputation is undeserved, at least in the case of one variety of non-naturalism – the variety Sidgwick offers. In section I, I present Sidgwick's view, distinguishing it from views with which it is often lumped. In II and III, I defend Sidgwick against recent objections to non-naturalism from motivation and supervenience. In IV, I briefly consider objections which brought about the downfall of non-natur…
Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate
Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate
Book Review| January 01 2000 Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE. By Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Pp. vi, 285. Robert Shaver Robert Shaver Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 125–128. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-1-125 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Dat…
A New History of Modern Moral Philosophy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Sidgwick's False Friends
Montaigne and the problem of living in others
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
La década de los 80 fue testigo de un renacimiento del realismo moral, sobre todo en los Estados Unidos.En artículos especializados, los filósofos Nicholas Sturgeon ("Moral Explanations" 1984), Peter Railton ("Moral Realism" 1986), Richard Boyd ("How to Be a Moral Realist" 1988), se distanciaron del "legado no-cognitivista" del siglo XX, que comienza con la metaética emotivista y prescríptivista de comienzos y mediados de siglo, y se extiende has…
Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory
This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as…
Leviathan, King of the Proud
Hobbes begins the Elements of Law by claiming that "[t]he true and perspicuous explanation of the elements of laws natural and politic... dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature." (E.L. I.1.1)1 He agrees that morality and politics are "not to be discovered but to be made," but they are to be made as solutions to problems discovered through a detailed study of human nature.2 Among other things, this study reveals that humans are obses…
Emile's Education
Rousseau and Recognition
Importance chez Rousseau de la critique du souci d'etre reconnu par autrui. L'A. analyse les themes de l'amour propre et de l'amour de soi chez Rousseau a partir de la problematique de la decision du travail et de la propriete privee
Prichard's Arguments against Ideal Utilitarianism
I give and evaluate Prichard's many (often obscure and idiosyncratic) arguments against ideal utilitarianism
Ross on Self and Others
Ross suggests a trilemma: (i) Innocent pleasure is good as an end. (ii) I have a prima facie duty to produce what is good as an end. (iii) I have no prima facie duty to produce innocent pleasure for myself. In The Right and the Good , he denies (iii). In Foundations of Ethics , he denies (i). Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. One ought instead to deny (ii). I close by considering a similar trilemma concerning justice
Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism
Sidgwick gives various tests for highest certainty. When he applies these tests to commonsense morality, he finds nothing of highest certainty. In contrast, when he applies these tests to his own axioms, he finds these axioms to have highest certainty. The axioms culminate in Benevolence: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, …
The Appeal of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism continues to vex its critics even in the absence of generally respected arguments in its favour. I suggest that utilitarianism survives largely because of its welfarism. This explains why it survives without the backing of respected arguments. It survives without such arguments because justifying the value of welfare requires no such argument
Rousseau and Recognition
Importance chez Rousseau de la critique du souci d'etre reconnu par autrui. L'A. analyse les themes de l'amour propre et de l'amour de soi chez Rousseau a partir de la problematique de la decision du travail et de la propriete privee
Leviathan, King of the Proud
Hobbes begins the Elements of Law by claiming that "[t]he true and perspicuous explanation of the elements of laws natural and politic... dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature." (E.L. I.1.1)1 He agrees that morality and politics are "not to be discovered but to be made," but they are to be made as solutions to problems discovered through a detailed study of human nature.2 Among other things, this study reveals that humans are obses…
Emile's Education
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
La década de los 80 fue testigo de un renacimiento del realismo moral, sobre todo en los Estados Unidos.En artículos especializados, los filósofos Nicholas Sturgeon ("Moral Explanations" 1984), Peter Railton ("Moral Realism" 1986), Richard Boyd ("How to Be a Moral Realist" 1988), se distanciaron del "legado no-cognitivista" del siglo XX, que comienza con la metaética emotivista y prescríptivista de comienzos y mediados de siglo, y se extiende has…
Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory
This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as…
Montaigne and the problem of living in others
Sidgwick's False Friends
Sidgwick's Minimal Metaethics
Non-naturalism has a shady reputation. This reputation is undeserved, at least in the case of one variety of non-naturalism – the variety Sidgwick offers. In section I, I present Sidgwick's view, distinguishing it from views with which it is often lumped. In II and III, I defend Sidgwick against recent objections to non-naturalism from motivation and supervenience. In IV, I briefly consider objections which brought about the downfall of non-natur…
Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate
Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate
Book Review| January 01 2000 Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE. By Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Pp. vi, 285. Robert Shaver Robert Shaver Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 125–128. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-1-125 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Dat…
A New History of Modern Moral Philosophy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History
Principia Then and Now
Moore is taken to have followed Sidgwick in his arguments against naturalism and in his consequentialism. I argue that there are differences on both issues. Sidgwick's arguments against naturalism do not rely on a controversial view of analysis, and one of his arguments for consequentialism gives him greater resources against critics of consequentialism such as T. M. Scanlon
The Appeal of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism continues to vex its critics even in the absence of generally respected arguments in its favour. I suggest that utilitarianism survives largely because of its welfarism. This explains why it survives without the backing of respected arguments. It survives without such arguments because justifying the value of welfare requires no such argument
Thomson's Trolley Switch
No abstract
The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism - Alison Hills
Ross on Self and Others
Ross suggests a trilemma: (i) Innocent pleasure is good as an end. (ii) I have a prima facie duty to produce what is good as an end. (iii) I have no prima facie duty to produce innocent pleasure for myself. In The Right and the Good , he denies (iii). In Foundations of Ethics , he denies (i). Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. One ought instead to deny (ii). I close by considering a similar trilemma concerning justice
Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism
Sidgwick gives various tests for highest certainty. When he applies these tests to commonsense morality, he finds nothing of highest certainty. In contrast, when he applies these tests to his own axioms, he finds these axioms to have highest certainty. The axioms culminate in Benevolence: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, …
The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics
Journal Article The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics Get access The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics.Byde Lazari-Radek Katarzyna Singer Peter. (Oxford: OUP, 2014. Pp. xvi + 403. Price £30.00.) Robert Shaver Robert Shaver University of Manitoba E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume …
Prichard's Arguments against Ideal Utilitarianism
I give and evaluate Prichard's many (often obscure and idiosyncratic) arguments against ideal utilitarianism
Sidgwick's Distinction Passage
I suggest that Sidgwick, in his controversial “distinction passage,” has Schopenhauer in mind as someone who denies egoism on the ground that there are no separate individuals. I then reconstruct Sidgwick's argument in the passage. I take him to be defending a presupposition of the case for choosing egoism over utilitarianism. He is claiming that there are separate individuals. I close by rejecting alternative interpretations, on which Sidgwick i…
The Decline of Egoism
Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, w…
Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons
Nietzsche on the value of power and pleasure
Nietzsche seems to hold that ‘higher types’, or examples of great power, are the only things good as an end. I consider and reject three reconstructions of Nietzsche’s argument for this: that it follows from understanding evolution, or from the will to power understood as a descriptive thesis, or from our admiration for such types. I suggest that Nietzsche’s strategy is to take for granted our shared admiration for higher types and then attack ou…
Against the Normativity of Welfare
Many think that welfare is a normative concept or property. I take it that claiming that the concept of welfare is normative is to claim that it follows analytically from G’s contributing to X’s welfare thatX has a reason to have a pro-attitude toward G. I point to advantages to thinking that welfare is not normative in this sense. I then criticise arguments for why one might think that welfare is a normative concept. Here I suggest other senses …
Philosophy (22 works) · Epistemology (21 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (12 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law and economics (6 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works)