Florian Steinberger
Biographic Data
| ID | 1037518 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Florian Steinberger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Florian |
| FAMILY NAME | Steinberger |
| SIGNATURE | STEINBERGER F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Birkbeck, University of London |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning.Famously, the tradition was challenged by Gilbert Harman who argued that there is no straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning.A number of authors (including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field) have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view of the normative status of logic against Harman.In this paper, I argue that the debate as a whole is marred by a fail…
Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic
Consequence and Normative Guidance
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap on…
How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality
In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well‐defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework‐internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first‐order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other …
Consequence and Normative Guidance
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap on…
Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning.Famously, the tradition was challenged by Gilbert Harman who argued that there is no straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning.A number of authors (including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field) have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view of the normative status of logic against Harman.In this paper, I argue that the debate as a whole is marred by a fail…
Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic
How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality
In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well‐defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework‐internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first‐order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other …
Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic
Consequence and Normative Guidance
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap on…
Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning.Famously, the tradition was challenged by Gilbert Harman who argued that there is no straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning.A number of authors (including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field) have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view of the normative status of logic against Harman.In this paper, I argue that the debate as a whole is marred by a fail…
Epistemology (4 works) · Normative (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Philosophy, Science, and History (2 works)