Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8063296 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Florian Steinberger (corresponding author), Journal Of Philosophy Inc |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 116 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 5-31 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-362X • E-ISSN: 1939-8549 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/jphil201911611 |
| OpenAlex | W2901685187 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 4 |
Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning.Famously, the tradition was challenged by Gilbert Harman who argued that there is no straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning.A number of authors (including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field) have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view of the normative status of logic against Harman.In this paper, I argue that the debate as a whole is marred by a failure of the disputing parties to distinguish three different types of normative assessment, and hence three distinct ways in which the question of the normativity of logic might be understood.Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent first-personal directives, they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards, or they might underwrite our thirdpersonal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame.I characterize the three normative functions in general terms.I then show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has impeded progress by leading the disputants to talk past one another.Moreover, I show how the distinction paves the way for a more fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question
Epistemology · Normative · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Ought-Implies-Can in Context
Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic
Self-knowledge and the Paradox of Belief Revision
The Normative Autonomy of Logic
Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms
Logic and Norms of Reasoning
Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic
Validity as a thick concept
Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism
Handling rejection
Zetetic norms and the normative autonomy of logic
The collapse of logical contextualism
Logical norms as defeasible obligations
A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism
Permissivism and Mismatched Granularity
A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic
Logical exceptionalism
The unrevisability of logic
Another way logic might be normative
Ought-contextualism and reasoning
Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic
Logic as a methodological discipline
Consequence and Normative Guidance
| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,56 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |