A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

Bibliographic Data

ID20143432
AuthorsFrancesco Orilia (0000-0002-3556-6552, Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Sezione di Filosofia e Scienze Umane University of Macerata Macerata Italy, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume88
Issue6
Pages1274-1292
Publication date2022-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12439
OpenAlexW4307824503
LanguageEN
References cited21

Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate bridge principles. Steinberger has identified a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy of previous proposals. This paper argues that Steinberger's list is in need of revision and his principle is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the normativity of logic

Bridge (graph theory) · Epistemology · Normative · Skepticism · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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