The Revision Theory of Truth
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23399217 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anil Gupta (0000-0003-3065-2598), Nuel Belnap |
| Year | 1993 |
| Publication date | 1993-03-18 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | The Revision Theory of Truth (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | The MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.7551/mitpress/5938.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2037341021 |
| ISBN | 9780262315999 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 59 |
In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological contexts. The latter include, for instance, contexts that generate Liar Paradox. Their central claim is that truth is a circular concept. In support of this claim they provide a widely applicable theory (the "revision theory") of circular concepts. Under the revision theory, when truth is seen as circular both its ordinary features and its pathological features fall into a simple understandable pattern. The Revision Theory of Truth is unique in placing truth in the context of a general theory of definitions. This theory makes sense of arbitrary systems of mutually interdependent concepts, of which circular concepts, such as truth, are but a special case. Bradford Books imprint
Alethiology · Coherence theory of truth · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Pragmatic theory of truth · Semantic theory of truth · Simple (philosophy) · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
Logicism and its Philosophical Legacy
Hop, Skip and Jump
Liars, truthtellers, and naysayers
Existence and definability of states of the world
A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences
Is self-identity essential to objects
Truth, the Liar, and Relativism
Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction
Theory of Truth
Syllogistic reasoning as a ground for the content of judgment
‘True’ as Polysemous
Should Theories of Logical Validity Self-Apply
On Logical and Scientific Strength
Paradoxicality Without Paradox
The intoxicating effects of conciliatory omniscience
Sets, lies, and analogy
Paradoxes of truth-in-context-X
Spelling out a truism about truth
Trouble no more
Logics of Truth and Maximality
The Influence of the Polish School in Logic on Mathematical Philosophy
A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic
Deflationism and the Function of Truth
In Defence of Radical Restrictionism
On The Hypothetical Given
Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox
Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority
Deep Platonism
Inconsistent Languages
Philosophical Analysis
Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox
Dynamic semiotics
The pathology of validity
Is the Hype about strength warranted
What is a Correspondence Theory of Truth
Vagueness and revision sequences
What's in a function
Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes
Self-referential propositions
Necessity predicate versus truth predicate from the perspective of paradox
Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth
What paradoxes depend on
Paradoxical hypodoxes
Two types of deflationism
Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T
Reference, paradoxes and truth
The Concept of Truth
More on Putnam and Tarski
Unrevisability
Wittgenstein and the liar
A case for weak Kleene ST
Conjunctive paraconsistency
The representation of gappy sentences in four-valued semantics
The Tarskian Turn
Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes
Circularity, Definition and Truth
Reflections on the Liar
Sentential Truth, Denominalization, and the Liar
What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)
| Unique citing works | 59 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,79 |
| Citation span | 1993 - 2025 (33) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 51 |