Inconsistent Languages

Bibliographic Data

ID10347337
AuthorsMatti Eklund (0000-0002-4280-5654, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume64
Issue2
Pages251-275
Publication date2002-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00001.x
OpenAlexW4240937130
LanguageEN
Citations received32
References cited33

The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in both conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox

Competence (human resources · Epistemology · Indeterminacy (philosophy · Linguistics · Virtue · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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