Matti Eklund
Biographic Data
| ID | 1042086 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matti Eklund |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matti |
| FAMILY NAME | Eklund |
| SIGNATURE | EKLUND M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4280-5654 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 78 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 26 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Conceptual engineering and conceptual innovation
Conceptual engineering, motivated one natural way, involves the search for new concepts. But to what extent does conceptual engineering as practiced involve such conceptual innovation, and to what extent can it do so? In this paper, I first argue that conceptual engineering as practiced surprisingly does not appear to involve conceptual innovation, and then I discuss problems regarding the extent to which it can involve conceptual innovation
Should moral intuitionism go social
In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism . We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual pr…
Schmoughts for Naught? Reply to Vermaire
In his article "Against Schmought" (The Journal of Philosophy, CXVIII 2021), Matthew Vermaire discusses the central problems I focus on in my book Choosing Normative Concepts (2017). Vermaire defends an attempted solution, or dissolution, of these problems. While there is much in Vermaire’s discussion to admire, I do not think Vermaire’s solution works, and here I explain why. Key to my response is the distinction between employing a concept and …
Edwards on truth pluralism
I critically discuss Douglas Edwards' construal of the debate over truth, and his case for truth pluralism. Toward the end I present a constructive suggestion on Edwards' behalf. This suggestion avoids the problems I have presented, whatever in the end its fate
Thin entities
Oystein Linnebo's book Thin Objects is partly devoted to defending the view that some objects are “thin” in that their existence does not impose any substantive demands on the world. In this paper, I discuss the concern that the defense relies on there being entities that serve as the referents of predicates. Linnebo thus seems to assume the thinness of those entities. In the course of my discussion, I also discuss what Linnebo says about the rol…
Normative Properties
In this chapter a number of different questions about normative properties are discussed. What are normative properties? What makes a property normative in the first place? What is the role of normative properties in the metaethical debate over realism and antirealism? What is the relationship between normative properties and normative concepts? Towards the end I bring up the point that there arguably are many normative properties besides those t…
Who cares if we’re not fully real? Comments on Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being
In part of The Fragmentation of Being , Kris McDaniel discusses the possibility that we—persons—are not fully real, and the normative upshot of this. The broader metaphysical context is a view on which different things have different degrees of being and what is discussed is the possibility that persons do not have the maximal degree of being. McDaniel thinks that this has a problematic normative upshot: we would not matter. I do not agree. Here …
Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy
This chapter provides an opinionated overview of conceptual engineering. It describes what conceptual engineering is. It assesses conceptual engineering as a philosophical project. It distinguishes between different philosophical projects related to conceptual engineering. It discusses how motivations behind conceptual engineering interact with different views on meaning and content.
What is deflationism about truth
What is deflationism about truth? There are many questions that can be raised about this, given the numerous different characterizations of deflationism in the literature. Here I attend to questions about the characterization of deflationism that arise when we carefully distinguish between issues pertaining to concepts and issues pertaining to properties
Thin Objects
The Normative Pluriverse
According to a certain pluralist view in philosophy of mathematics, there are as many mathematical objects as there can coherently be. Recently, Justin Clarke-Doane has explored what consequences the analogous view on normative properties would have. What if there is a normative pluriverse? Here I address this same question. The challenge is best seen as a challenge to an important form of normative realism. I criticize the way Clarke-Doane prese…
Reply to Bykvist and Olson
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Regress, unity, facts, and propositions
The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between diff…
Normative Concepts
What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is that a concept is normative if it is in the right way associated with a normative use. Among issues discussed along the way are the nature of analyticity, and there being a notion of analyticity—what I call semantic analyticity—such that a statement c…
Choosing Normative Concepts
Theorists working on metaethics and the nature of normativity typically study goodness, rightness, what ought to be done, etc. In their investigations they employ and consider our actual normative concepts. But the actual concepts of goodness, rightness, and what ought to be done are only some of the possible normative concepts. There are other possible concepts, ascribing different properties. In this book, the consequences of this are explored,…
Multitude, tolerance and language-transcendence
The Philosophy of Philosophy
Williamson, Timothy, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, pp. xiv + 332, US$29.95 (paperback). This book concerns the practice of philosophy. In chapters 3–4, Williamson cri...
Bad company and neo-Fregean philosophy
The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism
Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non‐cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non‐cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non‐cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non‐cognitivist's account o…
Characterizing Vagueness
This article focuses on the question of what characterizes vagueness (in the sense of 'vague' relevant to philosophical discussions of vagueness). It is shown how this question differs from other questions in the vagueness literature, such as those of how the sorites paradox can be solved, what the logic of vagueness is, and what sort of indeterminacy vagueness is associated with. Recent work on the topic, including work by Patrick Greenough, Nic…
Neo‐fregean Ontology
Metaontology
Metaontology - the study of the nature of ontological issues - has flourished in recent years. The focus of this summary will be on some views and arguments that are central to today's debate. One theme will be that of how seriously to take ontology: whether there is reason to take a skeptical or deflationary attitude toward ontological claims, as theorists like Rudolf Carnap, Hilary Putnam, and Eli Hirsch in different ways have urged. The other …
Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology
In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. the difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. the fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits her…
Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity
Book Review| April 01 2004 Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 549. Matti Eklund Matti Eklund Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 288–292. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-2-288 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Face…
Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order
Choosing Normative Concepts
Theorists working on metaethics and the nature of normativity typically study goodness, rightness, what ought to be done, etc. In their investigations they employ and consider our actual normative concepts. But the actual concepts of goodness, rightness, and what ought to be done are only some of the possible normative concepts. There are other possible concepts, ascribing different properties. In this book, the consequences of this are explored,…
Inconsistent Languages
The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in both conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face…
Neo‐fregean Ontology
Metaontology
Metaontology - the study of the nature of ontological issues - has flourished in recent years. The focus of this summary will be on some views and arguments that are central to today's debate. One theme will be that of how seriously to take ontology: whether there is reason to take a skeptical or deflationary attitude toward ontological claims, as theorists like Rudolf Carnap, Hilary Putnam, and Eli Hirsch in different ways have urged. The other …
Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology
In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. the difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. the fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits her…
What is deflationism about truth
What is deflationism about truth? There are many questions that can be raised about this, given the numerous different characterizations of deflationism in the literature. Here I attend to questions about the characterization of deflationism that arise when we carefully distinguish between issues pertaining to concepts and issues pertaining to properties
Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order
Regress, unity, facts, and propositions
The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between diff…
Multitude, tolerance and language-transcendence
Bad company and neo-Fregean philosophy
The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism
Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non‐cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non‐cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non‐cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non‐cognitivist's account o…
Characterizing Vagueness
This article focuses on the question of what characterizes vagueness (in the sense of 'vague' relevant to philosophical discussions of vagueness). It is shown how this question differs from other questions in the vagueness literature, such as those of how the sorites paradox can be solved, what the logic of vagueness is, and what sort of indeterminacy vagueness is associated with. Recent work on the topic, including work by Patrick Greenough, Nic…
Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order
Inconsistent Languages
The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in both conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face…
Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity
Book Review| April 01 2004 Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 549. Matti Eklund Matti Eklund Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 288–292. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-2-288 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Face…
Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology
In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. the difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. the fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits her…
Neo‐fregean Ontology
Metaontology
Metaontology - the study of the nature of ontological issues - has flourished in recent years. The focus of this summary will be on some views and arguments that are central to today's debate. One theme will be that of how seriously to take ontology: whether there is reason to take a skeptical or deflationary attitude toward ontological claims, as theorists like Rudolf Carnap, Hilary Putnam, and Eli Hirsch in different ways have urged. The other …
Characterizing Vagueness
This article focuses on the question of what characterizes vagueness (in the sense of 'vague' relevant to philosophical discussions of vagueness). It is shown how this question differs from other questions in the vagueness literature, such as those of how the sorites paradox can be solved, what the logic of vagueness is, and what sort of indeterminacy vagueness is associated with. Recent work on the topic, including work by Patrick Greenough, Nic…
Bad company and neo-Fregean philosophy
The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism
Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non‐cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non‐cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non‐cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non‐cognitivist's account o…
The Philosophy of Philosophy
Williamson, Timothy, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, pp. xiv + 332, US$29.95 (paperback). This book concerns the practice of philosophy. In chapters 3–4, Williamson cri...
Multitude, tolerance and language-transcendence
Normative Concepts
What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is that a concept is normative if it is in the right way associated with a normative use. Among issues discussed along the way are the nature of analyticity, and there being a notion of analyticity—what I call semantic analyticity—such that a statement c…
Choosing Normative Concepts
Theorists working on metaethics and the nature of normativity typically study goodness, rightness, what ought to be done, etc. In their investigations they employ and consider our actual normative concepts. But the actual concepts of goodness, rightness, and what ought to be done are only some of the possible normative concepts. There are other possible concepts, ascribing different properties. In this book, the consequences of this are explored,…
Reply to Bykvist and Olson
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Regress, unity, facts, and propositions
The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between diff…
The Normative Pluriverse
According to a certain pluralist view in philosophy of mathematics, there are as many mathematical objects as there can coherently be. Recently, Justin Clarke-Doane has explored what consequences the analogous view on normative properties would have. What if there is a normative pluriverse? Here I address this same question. The challenge is best seen as a challenge to an important form of normative realism. I criticize the way Clarke-Doane prese…
Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy
This chapter provides an opinionated overview of conceptual engineering. It describes what conceptual engineering is. It assesses conceptual engineering as a philosophical project. It distinguishes between different philosophical projects related to conceptual engineering. It discusses how motivations behind conceptual engineering interact with different views on meaning and content.
What is deflationism about truth
What is deflationism about truth? There are many questions that can be raised about this, given the numerous different characterizations of deflationism in the literature. Here I attend to questions about the characterization of deflationism that arise when we carefully distinguish between issues pertaining to concepts and issues pertaining to properties
Thin Objects
Who cares if we’re not fully real? Comments on Kris McDaniel’s The Fragmentation of Being
In part of The Fragmentation of Being , Kris McDaniel discusses the possibility that we—persons—are not fully real, and the normative upshot of this. The broader metaphysical context is a view on which different things have different degrees of being and what is discussed is the possibility that persons do not have the maximal degree of being. McDaniel thinks that this has a problematic normative upshot: we would not matter. I do not agree. Here …
Should moral intuitionism go social
In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism . We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual pr…
Schmoughts for Naught? Reply to Vermaire
In his article "Against Schmought" (The Journal of Philosophy, CXVIII 2021), Matthew Vermaire discusses the central problems I focus on in my book Choosing Normative Concepts (2017). Vermaire defends an attempted solution, or dissolution, of these problems. While there is much in Vermaire’s discussion to admire, I do not think Vermaire’s solution works, and here I explain why. Key to my response is the distinction between employing a concept and …
Edwards on truth pluralism
I critically discuss Douglas Edwards' construal of the debate over truth, and his case for truth pluralism. Toward the end I present a constructive suggestion on Edwards' behalf. This suggestion avoids the problems I have presented, whatever in the end its fate
Thin entities
Oystein Linnebo's book Thin Objects is partly devoted to defending the view that some objects are “thin” in that their existence does not impose any substantive demands on the world. In this paper, I discuss the concern that the defense relies on there being entities that serve as the referents of predicates. Linnebo thus seems to assume the thinness of those entities. In the course of my discussion, I also discuss what Linnebo says about the rol…
Normative Properties
In this chapter a number of different questions about normative properties are discussed. What are normative properties? What makes a property normative in the first place? What is the role of normative properties in the metaethical debate over realism and antirealism? What is the relationship between normative properties and normative concepts? Towards the end I bring up the point that there arguably are many normative properties besides those t…
Epistemology (24 works) · Philosophy (23 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (15 works) · Computer Science (14 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 works) · Normative (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (6 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of language (6 works)