The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351241 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matti Eklund (0000-0002-4280-5654, Cornell University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 237 |
| Pages | 705-712 |
| Publication date | 2009-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.600.x |
| OpenAlex | W2008958732 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non‐cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non‐cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non‐cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non‐cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too
Cognition · Cognitivism (psychology) · Epistemology · Expressivism · Meaning (existential) · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2017 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |