Logical exceptionalism

Development and predicaments

Bibliographic Data

ID20143401
AuthorsBo Chen (0009-0009-0184-3556, School of Philosophy, Wuhan University Wuhan China, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume90
Issue3
Pages295-321
Publication date2024-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12533
OpenAlexW4399128696
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited67

This paper examines the conceptions of logic from Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and Ayer, and regards the six philosophers as the representatives of logical exceptionalism. From their standpoints, this paper refines the tenets of logical exceptionalism as follows: logic is exceptional to all other sciences because of four reasons: (i) logic is formal, neutral to any domain and any entities, and general; (ii) logical truths are made true by the meanings of logical constants they contain or by logicians' rational insight to consequence relations; (iii) logical truths are analytical, a prior and necessary, so not‐revisable; and (iv) logical laws are normative for how to correctly think. However, logical exceptionalism has encountered difficult open problems: What are logical constants? How to justify basic laws of logic? How are logical laws accessible to us? How to explain the reasonability of rival logics and select from them? How to explain the universal applicability of logical laws? How to explain the normativity of logical laws for correct thinking? This paper concludes that logical anti‐exceptionalism is more hopeful to successfully answer these questions than logical exceptionalism

Development (topology) · Epistemology · Exceptionalism · Political science · Politics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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