Arash Abizadeh
Biographic Data
| ID | 1043974 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arash Abizadeh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arash |
| FAMILY NAME | Abizadeh |
| SIGNATURE | ABIZADEH A |
| AFFILIATIONS | McGill University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8271-5194 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 28 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 736 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 12 |
Elicitory Structural Power and Agential Power: An Outline and Defense
Many theorists assume that social power operates only by way of agents’ intentional actions and their causal influence on outcomes—where causality is understood to imply making a difference. This article challenges all three assumptions. It defends, first, the idea that one can play a causal role even without making a difference; second, a notion of structural power as a species of “elicitory” power, which does not operate by way of one’s intenti…
The burdens of jurisdiction and the alleged right to exclude unwanted migrants
Power, costs, collective action, bargaining, and solidarity
Some argue that the more costly it would be to exercise one's power over an issue, the less power one inherently has over it. I challenge this thesis with two major objections—one conceptual, the other practical or explanatory—contending that costs influence issue‐power not inherently but contingently in specifically strategic contexts. Since agents’ strategic dispositions are partly shaped by their perception of others’ strategic incentives or d…
The blocker postulates for measures of voting power
What toleration is not
Following Andrew Jason Cohen, Lucia Rafanelli construes toleration to consist in not merely limiting one’s interference with others’ behaviour, but doing so because of a principled commitment to respecting others’ independent choices. I argue that this conflates toleration with distinctly liberal ideals such as freedom of conscience or autonomy. This conflation not only impoverishes our conceptual vocabulary by using ‘toleration’ to label concept…
The Grammar of Social Power: Power-to, Power-with, Power-despite and Power-over
There are two rival conceptions of power in modern sociopolitical thought. According to one, all social power reduces to power-over-others. According to another, the core notion is power-to-effect-outcomes, to which even power-over reduces. This article defends seven theses. First, agential social power consists in a relation between agent and outcomes (power-to). Second, not all social power reduces to power-over and, third, the contrary view st…
A Recursive Measure of Voting Power with Partial Decisiveness or Efficacy
The current literature standardly conceives of voting power in terms of decisiveness: the ability to change the voting outcome by unilaterally changing one’s vote. I argue that this classic conception of voting power, which fails to account for partial decisiveness or efficacy, produces erroneous results because it saddles the concept of voting power with implausible microfoundations. This failure in the measure of voting power in turn reflects a…
Consequences, Conscience, and Fallibility: Early Modern Roots of Toleration
The transition away from the highly intolerant and persecutory regimes of late-medieval and early-modern Europe was facilitated by four important developments. First, Europeans learned that social order and cohesion are threatened less by diversity than by intolerance of it. Second, the traditionally paternalist vision of the state’s role was called into question by a new valuation of the individual conscience and consequently of individual liber…
The Power of Numbers: On Agential Power‐With‐Others Without Power‐Over‐Others
Representation, Bicameralism, Political Equality, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Second Chamber as a Randomly Selected Assembly
The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative dem…
Counter-Majoritarian Democracy: Persistent Minorities, Federalism, and the Power of Numbers
The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism-and even representative institutions-are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy's core normative commitments-namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails…
Hobbes's Conventionalist Theology, the Trinity, and God as an Artificial Person by Fiction
By the time Hobbes wrote Leviathan , he was a theist, but not in the sense presumed by either side of the present-day debate concerning the sincerity of his professed theism. On the one hand, Hobbes's expressed theology was neither merely deistic, nor confined to natural theology: the Hobbesian God is not merely a first mover, but a person who counsels, commands, and threatens. On the other hand, the Hobbesian God's existence depends on being con…
Wage competition and the special-obligations challenge to more open borders
According to the special-obligations challenge to the justice argument for more open borders, immigration restrictions to wealthier polities are justified because of special obligations owed to disadvantaged compatriots negatively impacted by the immigration of low-skilled foreign workers. We refute the special-obligations challenge by refuting its empirical premise and draw out the normative implications of the empirical evidence for border poli…
Publicity, Privacy, and Religious Toleration in Hobbes's Leviathan
What motivated an absolutist Erastian who rejected religious freedom, defended uniform public worship, and deemed the public expression of disagreement a catalyst for war to endorse a movement known to history as the champion of toleration, religion's freedom from coercion, and separation of church and state? At least three factors motivated Hobbes's 1651 endorsement of Independency: the Erastianism of Cromwellian Independency, the influence of t…
On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem
Cultural-nationalist and democratic theory both seek to legitimize political power via collective self-rule: Their principle of legitimacy refers right back to the very persons over whom political power is exercised. But such self-referential theories are incapable of jointly solving the distinct problems of legitimacy and boundaries, which they necessarily combine, once it is assumed that the self-ruling collectivity must be a prepolitical, in p…
Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory
Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory. The primary sou…
Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller
I have argued that, to be democratically legitimate, a state's regime of border control must result from political processes in which those subject to it? including foreigners?have a right of democratic participation. David Miller resists that conclusion by challenging my assumptions about the nature of, and relationship between, democratic legitimacy, state coercion, and autonomy. In particular, Miller rejects propositions (1.2) through (3.2) be…
Is there a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities?
The Passions of the Wise: Phronēsis , Rhetoric, and Aristotle’s Passionate Practical Deliberation
THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO REASONS WHY contemporary moral and political philosophers should be attentive to Aristotle's account of practical reason. First, in contradistinction with views that characterize the emotions primarily as a hindrance to practical reasoning, moral philosophers have become increasingly impressed with the revived Aristotelian insight that good practical reasoning systematically relies on the emotions. Second, accounts of pract…
Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders
The question of whether a closed border entry policy under the unilateral control of a democratic state is legitimate cannot be settled until we first know to whom the justification of a regime of control is owed. According to the state sovereignty view, the control of entry policy, including of movement, immigration, and naturalization, ought to be under the unilateral discretion of the state itself: justification for entry policy is owed solely…
On the philosophy/rhetoric binaries: Or, is Habermasian discourse motivationally impotent
The susceptibility of Habermas' socio-political theory (and notion of constitutional patriotism) to the charge of motivational impotence can be traced to a problem in the way in which he conceives of discursive practical reason. By implicitly constructing the notion of discursive rationality in contrast to, and in abstraction from, the rhetorical and affective components of language use, Habermas' notion of discursive practical reason ends up rei…
Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice
It is widely known that in A Theory of Justice Rawls restricted the scope of distributive justice to the domestic context of a single polity.1 This restriction implies that citizens have responsibilities of distributive justice to each other that they do not have to foreigners. Rawls's readers widely thought that he had motivated this anticosmopolitan restriction, despite his commitment to the equal moral worth of all, on the basis of two assumpt…
Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity
Two arguments apparently support the thesis that collective identity presupposes an Other: therecognition argument, according to which seeing myself as a self requires recognition by an other whom I also recognize as a self (Hegel); and thedialogic argument, according to which my sense of self can only develop dialogically (Taylor). But applying these arguments tocollectiveidentity involves a compositional fallacy. Two modern ideologies mask the …
Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence of Liberal Nationalism
Liberal nationalist versus postnational social integration: On the Nation's Ethno‐cultural Particularity and ‘Concreteness
Liberal nationalists advance two claims: (1) an empirical claim that nationalism is functionally indispensable to the viability of liberal democracy (because it is necessary to social integration) and (2) a normative claim that some forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms. The empirical claim is often supported, against postnationalists' view that social integration can bypass ethnicity and nationality, by pointing to th…
Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders
The question of whether a closed border entry policy under the unilateral control of a democratic state is legitimate cannot be settled until we first know to whom the justification of a regime of control is owed. According to the state sovereignty view, the control of entry policy, including of movement, immigration, and naturalization, ought to be under the unilateral discretion of the state itself: justification for entry policy is owed solely…
On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem
Cultural-nationalist and democratic theory both seek to legitimize political power via collective self-rule: Their principle of legitimacy refers right back to the very persons over whom political power is exercised. But such self-referential theories are incapable of jointly solving the distinct problems of legitimacy and boundaries, which they necessarily combine, once it is assumed that the self-ruling collectivity must be a prepolitical, in p…
Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity
Two arguments apparently support the thesis that collective identity presupposes an Other: therecognition argument, according to which seeing myself as a self requires recognition by an other whom I also recognize as a self (Hegel); and thedialogic argument, according to which my sense of self can only develop dialogically (Taylor). But applying these arguments tocollectiveidentity involves a compositional fallacy. Two modern ideologies mask the …
Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice
It is widely known that in A Theory of Justice Rawls restricted the scope of distributive justice to the domestic context of a single polity.1 This restriction implies that citizens have responsibilities of distributive justice to each other that they do not have to foreigners. Rawls's readers widely thought that he had motivated this anticosmopolitan restriction, despite his commitment to the equal moral worth of all, on the basis of two assumpt…
Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments
This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationa…
Representation, Bicameralism, Political Equality, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Second Chamber as a Randomly Selected Assembly
The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative dem…
Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller
I have argued that, to be democratically legitimate, a state's regime of border control must result from political processes in which those subject to it? including foreigners?have a right of democratic participation. David Miller resists that conclusion by challenging my assumptions about the nature of, and relationship between, democratic legitimacy, state coercion, and autonomy. In particular, Miller rejects propositions (1.2) through (3.2) be…
Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory
Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory. The primary sou…
Counter-Majoritarian Democracy: Persistent Minorities, Federalism, and the Power of Numbers
The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism-and even representative institutions-are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy's core normative commitments-namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails…
Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence of Liberal Nationalism
The Grammar of Social Power: Power-to, Power-with, Power-despite and Power-over
There are two rival conceptions of power in modern sociopolitical thought. According to one, all social power reduces to power-over-others. According to another, the core notion is power-to-effect-outcomes, to which even power-over reduces. This article defends seven theses. First, agential social power consists in a relation between agent and outcomes (power-to). Second, not all social power reduces to power-over and, third, the contrary view st…
Liberal nationalist versus postnational social integration: On the Nation's Ethno‐cultural Particularity and ‘Concreteness
Liberal nationalists advance two claims: (1) an empirical claim that nationalism is functionally indispensable to the viability of liberal democracy (because it is necessary to social integration) and (2) a normative claim that some forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms. The empirical claim is often supported, against postnationalists' view that social integration can bypass ethnicity and nationality, by pointing to th…
On the philosophy/rhetoric binaries: Or, is Habermasian discourse motivationally impotent
The susceptibility of Habermas' socio-political theory (and notion of constitutional patriotism) to the charge of motivational impotence can be traced to a problem in the way in which he conceives of discursive practical reason. By implicitly constructing the notion of discursive rationality in contrast to, and in abstraction from, the rhetorical and affective components of language use, Habermas' notion of discursive practical reason ends up rei…
Publicity, Privacy, and Religious Toleration in Hobbes's Leviathan
What motivated an absolutist Erastian who rejected religious freedom, defended uniform public worship, and deemed the public expression of disagreement a catalyst for war to endorse a movement known to history as the champion of toleration, religion's freedom from coercion, and separation of church and state? At least three factors motivated Hobbes's 1651 endorsement of Independency: the Erastianism of Cromwellian Independency, the influence of t…
Banishing the Particular: Rousseau on Rhetoric, Patrie, and the Passions
I begin with a dilemma: how to combine political rule, which rests ultimately on a moment of coercion, withfreedom-freedom from subjection to the arbitrary and particular will of an other. In this formulation, political rule threatens freedom with (1) the possibility of subjection to an arbitrary will, that is, a will that is either inconstant, uncertain, and ungrounded, or that simply rests on a particular and arbitrary ground, and (2) the possi…
The Power of Numbers: On Agential Power‐With‐Others Without Power‐Over‐Others
Wage competition and the special-obligations challenge to more open borders
According to the special-obligations challenge to the justice argument for more open borders, immigration restrictions to wealthier polities are justified because of special obligations owed to disadvantaged compatriots negatively impacted by the immigration of low-skilled foreign workers. We refute the special-obligations challenge by refuting its empirical premise and draw out the normative implications of the empirical evidence for border poli…
A Recursive Measure of Voting Power with Partial Decisiveness or Efficacy
The current literature standardly conceives of voting power in terms of decisiveness: the ability to change the voting outcome by unilaterally changing one’s vote. I argue that this classic conception of voting power, which fails to account for partial decisiveness or efficacy, produces erroneous results because it saddles the concept of voting power with implausible microfoundations. This failure in the measure of voting power in turn reflects a…
Banishing the Particular: Rousseau on Rhetoric, Patrie, and the Passions
I begin with a dilemma: how to combine political rule, which rests ultimately on a moment of coercion, withfreedom-freedom from subjection to the arbitrary and particular will of an other. In this formulation, political rule threatens freedom with (1) the possibility of subjection to an arbitrary will, that is, a will that is either inconstant, uncertain, and ungrounded, or that simply rests on a particular and arbitrary ground, and (2) the possi…
Informational Constraint and Focal Point Convergence: Theoretical Implications of Plurality-Rule Elections for the New Institutionalism
Plurality-rule national Baha'i elections are an anomaly among democratic elections, providing the opportunity for novel insights into institutional theory: while the pool of candidates consists of several thousand individuals, there are tight institutional constraints on information and communication regarding voters' preferences - nominations and campaigning are banned. Contrary to the expectations of received rational choice institutional theor…
Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments
This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationa…
Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence of Liberal Nationalism
Liberal nationalist versus postnational social integration: On the Nation's Ethno‐cultural Particularity and ‘Concreteness
Liberal nationalists advance two claims: (1) an empirical claim that nationalism is functionally indispensable to the viability of liberal democracy (because it is necessary to social integration) and (2) a normative claim that some forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms. The empirical claim is often supported, against postnationalists' view that social integration can bypass ethnicity and nationality, by pointing to th…
Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity
Two arguments apparently support the thesis that collective identity presupposes an Other: therecognition argument, according to which seeing myself as a self requires recognition by an other whom I also recognize as a self (Hegel); and thedialogic argument, according to which my sense of self can only develop dialogically (Taylor). But applying these arguments tocollectiveidentity involves a compositional fallacy. Two modern ideologies mask the …
On the philosophy/rhetoric binaries: Or, is Habermasian discourse motivationally impotent
The susceptibility of Habermas' socio-political theory (and notion of constitutional patriotism) to the charge of motivational impotence can be traced to a problem in the way in which he conceives of discursive practical reason. By implicitly constructing the notion of discursive rationality in contrast to, and in abstraction from, the rhetorical and affective components of language use, Habermas' notion of discursive practical reason ends up rei…
Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice
It is widely known that in A Theory of Justice Rawls restricted the scope of distributive justice to the domestic context of a single polity.1 This restriction implies that citizens have responsibilities of distributive justice to each other that they do not have to foreigners. Rawls's readers widely thought that he had motivated this anticosmopolitan restriction, despite his commitment to the equal moral worth of all, on the basis of two assumpt…
Is there a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities?
The Passions of the Wise: Phronēsis , Rhetoric, and Aristotle’s Passionate Practical Deliberation
THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO REASONS WHY contemporary moral and political philosophers should be attentive to Aristotle's account of practical reason. First, in contradistinction with views that characterize the emotions primarily as a hindrance to practical reasoning, moral philosophers have become increasingly impressed with the revived Aristotelian insight that good practical reasoning systematically relies on the emotions. Second, accounts of pract…
Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders
The question of whether a closed border entry policy under the unilateral control of a democratic state is legitimate cannot be settled until we first know to whom the justification of a regime of control is owed. According to the state sovereignty view, the control of entry policy, including of movement, immigration, and naturalization, ought to be under the unilateral discretion of the state itself: justification for entry policy is owed solely…
Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller
I have argued that, to be democratically legitimate, a state's regime of border control must result from political processes in which those subject to it? including foreigners?have a right of democratic participation. David Miller resists that conclusion by challenging my assumptions about the nature of, and relationship between, democratic legitimacy, state coercion, and autonomy. In particular, Miller rejects propositions (1.2) through (3.2) be…
Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory
Hobbesian war primarily arises not because material resources are scarce; or because humans ruthlessly seek survival before all else; or because we are naturally selfish, competitive, or aggressive brutes. Rather, it arises because we are fragile, fearful, impressionable, and psychologically prickly creatures susceptible to ideological manipulation, whose anger can become irrationally inflamed by even trivial slights to our glory. The primary sou…
On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem
Cultural-nationalist and democratic theory both seek to legitimize political power via collective self-rule: Their principle of legitimacy refers right back to the very persons over whom political power is exercised. But such self-referential theories are incapable of jointly solving the distinct problems of legitimacy and boundaries, which they necessarily combine, once it is assumed that the self-ruling collectivity must be a prepolitical, in p…
Publicity, Privacy, and Religious Toleration in Hobbes's Leviathan
What motivated an absolutist Erastian who rejected religious freedom, defended uniform public worship, and deemed the public expression of disagreement a catalyst for war to endorse a movement known to history as the champion of toleration, religion's freedom from coercion, and separation of church and state? At least three factors motivated Hobbes's 1651 endorsement of Independency: the Erastianism of Cromwellian Independency, the influence of t…
Wage competition and the special-obligations challenge to more open borders
According to the special-obligations challenge to the justice argument for more open borders, immigration restrictions to wealthier polities are justified because of special obligations owed to disadvantaged compatriots negatively impacted by the immigration of low-skilled foreign workers. We refute the special-obligations challenge by refuting its empirical premise and draw out the normative implications of the empirical evidence for border poli…
Hobbes's Conventionalist Theology, the Trinity, and God as an Artificial Person by Fiction
By the time Hobbes wrote Leviathan , he was a theist, but not in the sense presumed by either side of the present-day debate concerning the sincerity of his professed theism. On the one hand, Hobbes's expressed theology was neither merely deistic, nor confined to natural theology: the Hobbesian God is not merely a first mover, but a person who counsels, commands, and threatens. On the other hand, the Hobbesian God's existence depends on being con…
The Power of Numbers: On Agential Power‐With‐Others Without Power‐Over‐Others
Representation, Bicameralism, Political Equality, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Second Chamber as a Randomly Selected Assembly
The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative dem…
Counter-Majoritarian Democracy: Persistent Minorities, Federalism, and the Power of Numbers
The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism-and even representative institutions-are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy's core normative commitments-namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails…
A Recursive Measure of Voting Power with Partial Decisiveness or Efficacy
The current literature standardly conceives of voting power in terms of decisiveness: the ability to change the voting outcome by unilaterally changing one’s vote. I argue that this classic conception of voting power, which fails to account for partial decisiveness or efficacy, produces erroneous results because it saddles the concept of voting power with implausible microfoundations. This failure in the measure of voting power in turn reflects a…
Consequences, Conscience, and Fallibility: Early Modern Roots of Toleration
The transition away from the highly intolerant and persecutory regimes of late-medieval and early-modern Europe was facilitated by four important developments. First, Europeans learned that social order and cohesion are threatened less by diversity than by intolerance of it. Second, the traditionally paternalist vision of the state’s role was called into question by a new valuation of the individual conscience and consequently of individual liber…
The blocker postulates for measures of voting power
What toleration is not
Following Andrew Jason Cohen, Lucia Rafanelli construes toleration to consist in not merely limiting one’s interference with others’ behaviour, but doing so because of a principled commitment to respecting others’ independent choices. I argue that this conflates toleration with distinctly liberal ideals such as freedom of conscience or autonomy. This conflation not only impoverishes our conceptual vocabulary by using ‘toleration’ to label concept…
The Grammar of Social Power: Power-to, Power-with, Power-despite and Power-over
There are two rival conceptions of power in modern sociopolitical thought. According to one, all social power reduces to power-over-others. According to another, the core notion is power-to-effect-outcomes, to which even power-over reduces. This article defends seven theses. First, agential social power consists in a relation between agent and outcomes (power-to). Second, not all social power reduces to power-over and, third, the contrary view st…
Political science (24 works) · Law (23 works) · Sociology (21 works) · Law (19 works) · Politics (19 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (16 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Law and economics (13 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Democracy (10 works)