Andrew Peet
Biographic Data
| ID | 1044307 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Peet |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Peet |
| SIGNATURE | PEET A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Umeå University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9143-2201 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The puzzle of plausible deniability
How is it that a speaker S can at once make it obvious to an audience A that she intends to communicate some proposition p , and yet at the same time retain plausible deniability with respect to this intention? The answer is that S can bring it about that A has a high justified credence that ‘ S intended p ’ without putting A in a position to know that ‘ S intended p ’. In order to achieve this S has to exploit a sense in which communication can …
Emotion, attention, and reason
Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the rationality of emotion and the rationality of att…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Collective Communicative Intentions in Context
What are the objects of speaker meaning? The traditional answer is: propositions. The traditional answer faces an important challenge: if propositions are the objects of speaker meaning then there must be specific propositions that speakers intend their audiences to recover. Yet, speakers typically exhibit a degree of indifference regarding how they are interpreted, and cannot rationally intend for their audiences to recover specific propositions…
Contrastive Intentions
This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses abo…
Deciding what we mean
Stipulation gives us a degree of control over meaning. By stipulating how I will use a term I am able to determine the meaning it will receive on future occasions of use. My stipulation will affect the truth conditional content of my future utterances. But the mechanisms of stipulation are mysterious. As Cappelen ([2018]. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/978019881471…
Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics
I argue that assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities undertaken by communicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitments are distinguished by being generated directly in virtue of the words the speaker uses. This raises two questions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the content thus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distinguish between commitments in terms of their manner of generation? …
Counterfactuals, indeterminacy, and value
Testimonial worth
Etiology, understanding, and testimonial belief
Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation
Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Testimonial worth
Etiology, understanding, and testimonial belief
Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation
Etiology, understanding, and testimonial belief
Testimonial worth
Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics
I argue that assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities undertaken by communicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitments are distinguished by being generated directly in virtue of the words the speaker uses. This raises two questions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the content thus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distinguish between commitments in terms of their manner of generation? …
Counterfactuals, indeterminacy, and value
Collective Communicative Intentions in Context
What are the objects of speaker meaning? The traditional answer is: propositions. The traditional answer faces an important challenge: if propositions are the objects of speaker meaning then there must be specific propositions that speakers intend their audiences to recover. Yet, speakers typically exhibit a degree of indifference regarding how they are interpreted, and cannot rationally intend for their audiences to recover specific propositions…
Contrastive Intentions
This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses abo…
Deciding what we mean
Stipulation gives us a degree of control over meaning. By stipulating how I will use a term I am able to determine the meaning it will receive on future occasions of use. My stipulation will affect the truth conditional content of my future utterances. But the mechanisms of stipulation are mysterious. As Cappelen ([2018]. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/978019881471…
The puzzle of plausible deniability
How is it that a speaker S can at once make it obvious to an audience A that she intends to communicate some proposition p , and yet at the same time retain plausible deniability with respect to this intention? The answer is that S can bring it about that A has a high justified credence that ‘ S intended p ’ without putting A in a position to know that ‘ S intended p ’. In order to achieve this S has to exploit a sense in which communication can …
Emotion, attention, and reason
Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the rationality of emotion and the rationality of att…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works)