Contrastive Intentions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21876342 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Peet (0000-0001-9143-2201, University of Leeds, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 742-761 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/apa.2022.33 |
| OpenAlex | W4366393497 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 28 |
This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses about intention, intentional action, and practical reason. And they give rise to a puzzle about rather-than constructions such as ‘I intend to φ rather than ψ ’: In side effect cases it can seem wrong to claim that the subject intends to φ yet acceptable to claim that they intend to φ rather than ψ . This cries out for explanation. Contrastivism provides a unified response to all of these problems
Binary relation · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |