Peter J Markie
Biographic Data
| ID | 1044868 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter J Markie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter J |
| FAMILY NAME | Markie |
| SIGNATURE | MARKIE P J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1315-0134 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Searching for True Dogmatism
Is there a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism? Michael Huemer has developed an unqualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism, but unqualified Dogmatism is false. Michael Bergmann has developed a qualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Foundationalism but inconsistent with Mentalism. I organize my search for a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Foundationalism …
Classical Foundationalism and Speckled Hens
Justification without Awareness – Michael Bergmann
Well written, tightly argued and provocative, this superb book represents the best in current work in epistemology. Bergmann champions an externalist account of doxastic justification, which ‘is more objective than subjective deontological justification (understood as epistemic blamelessness) and yet insufficient for warrant’ (p. 6). He says little about the standards for a successful account, but rejects one common expectation of many epistemolo…
Easy Knowledge
Stewart Cohen has recently presented solutions to two forms of what he calls “The Problem of Easy Knowledge” (“Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 2, September 2002, pp. 309-329). I offer alternative solutions. Like Cohen's, my solutions allow for basic knowledge. Unlike his, they do not require that we distinguish between animal and reflective knowledge, restrict the applicability of…
Respect for People and Animals
Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence
How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function , Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belie…
Ethics
Goldman's New Reliabilism
Descartes's Gambit
Descartes's Gambit
Multiple Propositions and "De Se" Attitudes
When someone has an intentional attitude, he is related to a thing that is the content of his attitude. What is that thing, and how is he related to it? Each intentional attitude has a de dicto. de re, and de se form. Is one the primary form by which the other two can be explained? The Multiple Propositions Theory answers these questions. The de dicto form of each intentional attitude is best analyzed as a relation between a person and a proposit…
The Cogito Puzzle
Descartes created the Cogito Puzzle by claiming to be certain of his existence and making several, seemingly nonequivalent, remarks about why his claim is true. Commentators, convinced that his remarks contain important philosophical insights, have tried to combine them into a single cogent explanation. I shall make a new attempt to solve the Cogito. I shall clarify Descartes' claim to certainty and then use my clarification to give a new interpr…
Dreams and Deceivers in Meditation One
Easy Knowledge
Stewart Cohen has recently presented solutions to two forms of what he calls “The Problem of Easy Knowledge” (“Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 2, September 2002, pp. 309-329). I offer alternative solutions. Like Cohen's, my solutions allow for basic knowledge. Unlike his, they do not require that we distinguish between animal and reflective knowledge, restrict the applicability of…
Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence
How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function , Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belie…
Classical Foundationalism and Speckled Hens
Multiple Propositions and "De Se" Attitudes
When someone has an intentional attitude, he is related to a thing that is the content of his attitude. What is that thing, and how is he related to it? Each intentional attitude has a de dicto. de re, and de se form. Is one the primary form by which the other two can be explained? The Multiple Propositions Theory answers these questions. The de dicto form of each intentional attitude is best analyzed as a relation between a person and a proposit…
Goldman's New Reliabilism
Dreams and Deceivers in Meditation One
The Cogito Puzzle
Descartes created the Cogito Puzzle by claiming to be certain of his existence and making several, seemingly nonequivalent, remarks about why his claim is true. Commentators, convinced that his remarks contain important philosophical insights, have tried to combine them into a single cogent explanation. I shall make a new attempt to solve the Cogito. I shall clarify Descartes' claim to certainty and then use my clarification to give a new interpr…
Multiple Propositions and "De Se" Attitudes
When someone has an intentional attitude, he is related to a thing that is the content of his attitude. What is that thing, and how is he related to it? Each intentional attitude has a de dicto. de re, and de se form. Is one the primary form by which the other two can be explained? The Multiple Propositions Theory answers these questions. The de dicto form of each intentional attitude is best analyzed as a relation between a person and a proposit…
Descartes's Gambit
Descartes's Gambit
Goldman's New Reliabilism
Ethics
Respect for People and Animals
Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence
How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function , Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belie…
Easy Knowledge
Stewart Cohen has recently presented solutions to two forms of what he calls “The Problem of Easy Knowledge” (“Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 2, September 2002, pp. 309-329). I offer alternative solutions. Like Cohen's, my solutions allow for basic knowledge. Unlike his, they do not require that we distinguish between animal and reflective knowledge, restrict the applicability of…
Justification without Awareness – Michael Bergmann
Well written, tightly argued and provocative, this superb book represents the best in current work in epistemology. Bergmann champions an externalist account of doxastic justification, which ‘is more objective than subjective deontological justification (understood as epistemic blamelessness) and yet insufficient for warrant’ (p. 6). He says little about the standards for a successful account, but rejects one common expectation of many epistemolo…
Classical Foundationalism and Speckled Hens
Searching for True Dogmatism
Is there a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism? Michael Huemer has developed an unqualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Mentalism and Foundationalism, but unqualified Dogmatism is false. Michael Bergmann has developed a qualified form of Dogmatism that is consistent with Foundationalism but inconsistent with Mentalism. I organize my search for a true form of Dogmatism consistent with Foundationalism …
Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Skepticism (3 works)